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pressure defy the underlying traditions for a radical change: the energy infrastruc-
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advanced communication gateways. This change will give rise to the development
of new business concepts and the coming into existence of new services.
There is no such thing as neutral development, where the competition and roles
are cemented the way we see them today. Changing of the business environment
forces the stakeholders to fit into the new system. This can cause friction among
the actors in the field.
The aim of this thesis is to identify the potential conflicts of interests between the
actors in a new environment. In order to find the conflicts, 25 specialist interviews
were conducted to map the black spots of the future.
It is found that the pressure focuses mainly to the still unclear line between the
regulated and competitive actors and their roles. The role of the regulated network
operators’ penetration to the service side is seen questionable.Also the ownership
of new, emerging concepts such as load control and distributed energy storages are
still unsolved and more clear stand from policy-makers and regulations is urged.
Thesis also conducts a study of an aggregator’s actions to the grid. It is found
that the synchronised control of electric heating with Spot-market signals are
done mainly during the night-time, when there is little of other consumption in
households. Therefore it can make the situation even better than today from the
distribution system operator’s point of view.
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Energia-ala on keskella¨ muutosta. Ympa¨risto¨tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi on
rakennettu uusiutuvaa energiantuotantoa, joka on luonteeltaan epa¨sa¨a¨nno¨llista¨
niin tuotantoma¨a¨ra¨lta¨a¨n kuin ajallisesti. Koska sa¨hko¨verkot ja markkinamekanis-
mit on rakennettu vastaamaan perinteista¨ systeemia¨ jossa energia tuotetaan su-
urissa voimalaitoksissa, aiheuttavat uusiutuvan energian voimakas lisa¨ys uusia
vaatimuksia koko infrastruktuurille. Muutos luo tarpeen kehitta¨a¨ uusia ratkaisuja,
kuten a¨lyverkot jotka lisa¨a¨va¨t automaatiota ja tietotekniikkaa sa¨hko¨verkkoon.
Markkinaympa¨risto¨n muutosten myo¨ta¨ myo¨s eri toimijoiden roolit kohtaavat muu-
toksia. Ta¨ma¨ voi aiheuttaa eturistiriitoja toimijoiden va¨lille: useammalla toim-
ijalla olisi valmiudet ja intresseja¨ murtautua samalle sektorille. Esimerkiksi use-
ammalla toimijalla on tarvetta kuormienohjaukseen.
Diplomityo¨ssa¨ on kartoitettu mahdolliset eturistiriidat joita voi syntya¨ eri toim-
ijoiden va¨lille. Mahdollisten eturistiriitojen kartoittamiseksi tehtiin 25 eri
sa¨hko¨alan osapuolen asiantuntijahaastattelua, jotta tyo¨ho¨n saataisiin mahdol-
lisimman kattava kuvaus mahdollisista riskeista¨.
Haastatteluiden ja kirjallisuuden perusteella tunnistettiin 33 erilaista eturistiri-
itaa. Tyo¨ssa¨ havaitaan etta¨ erityisesti reguloidun jakeluverkkoyhtio¨n roolista on
eroavia na¨kemyksia¨ ja asiaan odotetaan selvennysta¨. A¨lyverkkojen mahdollista-
mat lisa¨palvelut pita¨isi saattaa kilpailtuun ympa¨risto¨o¨n, eika¨ na¨in ollen niita¨ voisi
jakeluverkkoyhtio¨ tarjota.
Tyo¨ssa¨ ka¨sitella¨a¨n jakeluverkkoyhtio¨n ja sa¨hko¨nmyyja¨n va¨lista¨ mahdollista eturis-
tiriitaa kuormien ohjauksen suhteen. Havaitaan, etta¨ Suomessa sa¨hko¨la¨mmityksen
yhdenmukainen ohjaus aggregaattori-myyja¨n toimesta tapahtuu la¨hinna¨ yo¨aikaan,
jolloin muu sa¨hko¨nkulutus kotitalouksissa on va¨ha¨ista¨. Na¨in ollen ohjaus voi jopa
parantaa nykyista¨ tilannetta.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Objectives and the scope of the study
The energy business is in the middle of great transition. The world is concerned
about the energy production’s effects to nature and climate, casting a shadow to
conventional energy sources such as oil, coal and natural gas. In order to cut down
the emissions from fossil based energy sources there is a need for new kind of energy
economy, including renewable energy sources like wind, solar and hydropower.
Transition from traditional energy production to inexhaustible and emission-free
production causes challenges to the existing electrical infrastructure. Additional re-
newable energy sources cause changes to the energy-mix, making it more inflexible
due to its intermittent nature: either the wind blows and sun shines, or doesn’t. To-
day’s power grids are not equipped to handle sharp increases and large fluctuations
in power flows. Integrating this kind of production to the network requires more
intelligence from the grid, by adding more self-monitoring, automated components.
As in any major change in business environment, the actors that operate in
old environment has to re-evaluate their role and position in a new environment.
Searching of the new positions mean that the boundaries from present roles to other
actors’ area might occur. This can cause frictions between players.
The main objective of this thesis is to identify the potential conflicts of interests
that actors experience causing by the change in environment. The focus is mainly
on Nordic countries’ perspective. Thesis is based on literature study and on inter-
views. The interviews were conducted in the autumn of 2012, and the interviewees
represented the views of different stakeholders in energy domain. The perspectives
of interviews include: a generator, a retailer, distribution system operator (DSO),
transmission system operator (TSO), a regulator, an aggregator, a representative
of large net-buyers of electricity and representatives of Finnish Energy Industries.
22 different persons were interviewed and the list of interviewees can be found in
Appendix A.
A Smart Grid rises to the discussion on how to respond to the future challenges
the electricity business has to manage. A short introduction to the concept of a
Smart Grid, to its benefits and the development phase outlook is found in Chapter
2.
In order to plot out the potential conflicts of interests, the analysis of the roles
and responsibilities of the current market players as well as the markets structure
where players are situated has to be conducted. Chapter 3 sheds the light on the
anomalies of electricity markets in general, giving insight on the characteristics of
the Nordic electricity markets’ functionality. The market players are introduced
with a description of each role.
To find the reasons for the coinciding interests, the understanding about the
future development that electricity markets will experience is crucial. As the elec-
tricity domain is a complex system, the main factors influencing the prospects has
to be identified. In a larger scale, the European level energy strategy as well as
national and regulatory barriers have an impact to the road map. In Chapter 4, the
future trends of energy market are discussed.
The literature study, backed up with more detailed information from interviews
gives the ideas for the problems and possibilities in near-future. Each player has a
change in its business. The potential challenges and possibilities for each player are
reviewed in Chapter 5.
Conflicting interests are collected in the Chapter 6. In total 33 conflicts of
interests were found through the interviews. Each conflict depicts the relationship
among the players and illustrates what is the problem. Also the ways to resolve the
problem is proposed.
Facilitation of load control is still unclear among players. Main question is who
has the right for control, since several stakeholder has the possibility and interest
to do demand response. If a retailer would control the loads, it might result in an
uncomfortable situation from the distribution network operator’s (DSO) point of
view. A case study is provided in Chapter 7, where the potential conflict between
DSO and a retailer is examined in more detail. The purpose of the case study is to
shed a light on what scale the impacts of an aggregator’s actions are in a situation
where the heating loads are controlled the cheapest possible hours according to the
Spot markets.
1.2 Fortum Oyj
Fortum is a Finnish electric utility company, founded in 1998. Fortum focuses on
doing business in Nordic and Baltic countries, Poland and Russia. Fortum’s main
activities are the generation, distribution and sales of electricity and related expert
services. [68]
The company has four business divisions: Power, Heat, Russia and Electricity
Solutions and Distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Fortum Distribution is the largest distribution company in Nordics, with 156 000
km of regional and local networks, having in total 1.6 million customers in Finland,
Sweden and Norway. [1]
Strategy for Fortum aims for continuous development of existing businesses and
for market-driven growth in hydro, nuclear and combined heat and power (CHP)
production. Furthermore to technical competencies of Fortum, the company’s ex-
pertise and proven track-record in operating in competitive energy markets has a
central role when striving for growth opportunities in existing markets as well as in
the rapidly growing and liberalizing markets of Europe and Asia. [68]
3Figure 1: Divisions of Fortum. [1]
42 Smart Grid
The concept of Smart Grid has been the focus point of research in energy world
for almost a decade. The idea is to introduce information and communications
technology to the electrical grid, and use the information gathered to enable more
intelligent grid design and use.
As the Smart Grid enables vast amount of new possible features, it has several
definitions ranging from technical perspective to more benefits-oriented approach.
EURELECTRIC, the Union of Electricity Industry has defined a Smart Grid as
follows:
• EURELECTRIC: ”A Smart Grid is an electricity network that can intelligently
integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – generators,
consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently ensure sustainable,
economic and secure electricity supply.” [8]
A Smart Grid is an enabler on transition to digital world with advanced tech-
nologies to monitor and manage the transportation of energy in future, where there
are new requirements on how the system works. In higher level it helps the energy
system to upgrade its transition to more sustainable world, striving to integrate re-
newable energy, improve the energy efficiency and cutting the greenhouse emissions.
In Figure 2 the transition to more sustainable energy production is illustrated.
Figure 2: Transition from traditional energy structure to solar economy. [68]
52.1 Drivers
With the changes on how society is using the energy and how it is produced, the
existing infrastructure undergoes several radical reforms as well. The main challenge
for the infrastructure is the increasing share of renewable energy and the volatility it
introduces to the system. In Figure 3 an illustrative example about the intermittent
nature of the wind power is shown. With large share of intermittent production in
the energy mix, it introduces volatility to the energy system which has not been
there before. The energy system has to adapt and find new approaches to keep the
system in balance.
Figure 3: Yearly power production for wind power. [4]
The main focus is to secure economic, reliable and sustainable energy system.
The intermittence of renewable energy is not the only challenge connected to it, but
also the trend that most of the renewable energy generation will be scattered, which
is a main contrast on how we see the energy infrastructure today.
Changes create a pressure to develop and make the infrastructure more agile,
proactive, real-time, more intelligent. This is needed to ensure the security of supply,
quality of supply and most of all safety in certain level of standard. [55]
2.2 Advantages
Adding more Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and intelligence
to the system is not easy nor cheap. For instance, more expensive hardware has
6to be added, completely new ICT architectures has to be created and more data
is produced, which is needed to verify and store reliably. Nevertheless, if the tran-
sition is done carefully, a Smart Grid has the potential to deliver vast amounts of
savings. More accurate data is gathered from the state of the grid. Monitoring
and finding more efficient solutions to avoid for example grid congestions becomes
easier. Processes can be re-designed more optimally, and utilization rate of different
components can be improved. With more detailed data from customers desires help
to create better products and services which in turn help EU to achieve its targets
of energy efficiency, integrate more renewable energy and cut down the emissions.
Another relevant point on why is it necessary to start concentrating on Smart
Grid is that the existing infrastructure is getting old. There is a need to vast
investments so most optimal and cost-efficient solution is not so straight-forward
than before. Technology develops and the old solutions get new competitors from
innovative solutions that have lately emerged. [51]
Main difference to the traditional grid design is that it enables the demand
flexibility, which means that grid infrastructure can be built in a more optimised
way, rather than ”fit and forget” procedure that we are seeing now, where the
electricity system is unable to take advantage of energy storages and peak load
shifting, delivering required amount of electricity and forgetting the possibility to
optimisation of components.
In Table 1 a variety of benefits from the Smart Grid to different players are
introduced.
A list gives a picture of the various benefits that Smart Grid carries and with
certain assumptions the points are applicable. Nevertheless it is very optimistic
and best-case-scenario on what the Smart Grid is. As an example, active end users
might not be helpful from Network Owner’s point of view, if the activity makes the
forecasting more volatile which leads to decrease in robustness of supply. Still, even
with optimistic bias of the Table, it carries one fundamental lesson: bringing ICT
to this sector makes all these listed improvements possible for the first time.
2.3 Challenges
A Smart Grid has great expectations to give solutions to problems energy domain
experiences: better efficiency can be achieved, network will become more secure
and demand becomes more flexible. It has been the hot topic in energy sector and
academic research from circa 2004. Even with a large interest towards it from the
energy domain, a lot of work has to be done before it will be developed to the
stage where it can be implemented to the infrastructure in a large scale. With new
technologies and business cases, barriers and challenges still remain to be solved,
major laboratory trials and field tests must be conducted before implementing new
concepts in a large scale. Main challenges are presented in Table 2.
More detailed information about the challenges that Smart Grid experiences can
be found in [51].
7Table 1: A list of benefits for a Smart Grid. [9]
Network Owner Energy Supplier End Users
Easier collection of con-
sumption measurements
New products based on new
technology
Increased security of supply
Invoicing based on real con-
sumption
Increased customer loyalty More environment friendly
Load reductions New customers Increased possibility to in-
fluence energy pricing/costs
Improved customer services
(i.e. disruption notices and
support, energy displays)
Reduced imbalance penal-
ties
Increased choice of supply
Increased regularity and ro-
bustness of supply
Better prognoses and pre-
dictions
Predictable energy costs
Improved monitoring of the
grid state and quality of
supply
Improved balance in opera-
tion
Reduced consumption
Active end users Less exposure towards price
variations
Reduced loads
New tariffs for favourable
consumption
Reduced maximum effects Sale of load reduction capa-
bilities
Integration of local produc-
tion
Sale of local production
Reduction of transport loss Income on storage
Reduced investments
2.4 Transition to a Smarter Grid
As the concept of a Smart Grid is holistic by its nature, the approach for the Research
and Development (R&D) needs to take on notice by several players in order to
achieve optimal solutions. Projects need to adapt a new kind of thinking of R&D,
where it is seen more as a network, focusing on collaboration in the whole system
level. A Smart Grid has pushed project management to take into consideration
more aspects since product and technology complexity increases. The demand to
cooperate is essential because of the high technological investments and the need
for specialization to even smaller fractions, and finally bringing all this together to
create something new and functional. [56]
Not only the complexity is increased because of the collaboration with different
electricity market actors, but also because of the synergy to ICT sector. Data is
gathered and distributed, which means that solutions from ICT are needed to enable
the transition. System becomes more complex than ever before.
In Figure 4, the projection of the Smart Grid development is shown.
8Table 2: A list of challenges for a Smart Grid. [51]
Technological
Challenges
Communication Coverage of Transmission and Distribution
Grids
Choice of Communication Technology
Information Security
Distributed Energy Resources Integration Challenge
Distribution Automation
Synergy with Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Cheap Energy Storage Technology
Grid Network Design
Economical Chal-
lenges
Market Barriers to the New Business Models
Social and Economic Issues
Business Chal-
lenges
Integration Challenge
Energy Management
Regulation Chal-
lenges
Interoperability
Lack of Standards and Regulations
The initial R&D stage has been carried out and at the moment the development
phase has been focusing on pilots showing feasibilities of different alternatives and
variations of products and services connected to Smart Grid domain. Ones that
show potential will be taken to the next stage, to a larger scale demonstrations of
concepts. If the larger scale demonstrations show feasibility, the strategic choices
about the direction of the Smart Grid development has to be made. As soon as
strategy is clear, the large scale implementation can begin.
Figure 4: Projected development for Smart Grid. [54]
92.5 Smart Grid components
Smart Grid enables concepts to the energy field which have not existed before. A
short description of the Smart Grid components are discussed in this section.
2.5.1 Distributed Generation
One major change in the energy system is the transition from centralised production
to more geographically scattered production units. Historically the power grid has
consisted of large centralised power plants, taking benefit from economies of scale
and building them close to resources. The resources have not necessarily been close
to consumption, resulting in long transmission distances of electricity. Also the
amount of electricity generation has been predictable, and the production unit’s
location is known. The grid planning in this model has been relatively simple:
the power flow is known both in size and the direction. With Distributed Energy
Resources (DER), the location and power flow correlates with the weather.
Distributed generation consists of smaller electricity production units which are
less site-specific. The size of the DG does not have exact range, but if it is defined
to take into account small-scale production and micro-production, it can range from
2 MWs downwards. Generally Distributed Generation (DG) production units are
considered as renewable energy sources: solar, wind, hydro and biopower. [50]
If DG starts to gain popularity widely, it creates challenges from traditional en-
ergy business perspective. As it is intermittent by nature and dependent on local
weather events, both amount and location of production is not known accurately.
Controllability of the system requires more automated solutions to keep under con-
trol.
2.5.2 Energy Storages
The value of flexibility in energy market will increase in the future, mainly be-
cause of the emergence of renewable energy. Renewable energy has often incentives
to produce energy whenever possible, thus making the production structure more
inflexible, causing the demand flexibility to become more valuable.
Therefore, storing energy has been a great interest in different R&D projects
lately. Traditionally there hasn’t been energy storages in the energy system. It has
not been profitable to acquire energy storage, since the price of electricity hasn’t
had enough volatility to have incentive for demand flexibility. Initial investments
for building energy storages are significant, there are losses when storing the energy
and the coefficient of efficiency when transforming the energy from one form to
another reduces the benefits.
The situation will change in the future. First, the battery technology is devel-
oping because of projects in hybrid and electric vehicles, which presses the prices of
storages down. Second, changes in energy generation incurs costs to the strengthen-
ing of the electric network and less controllability implies to the increasing volatility
of the electricity prices. The energy storages can help to balance the situation, both
network-wise as well as market-wise. [17]
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Energy storages have a role also in securing better functioning in transmission
and distribution system level. Storages help the balancing of demand and intermit-
tent generation, which has the benefit for both TSO and DSO. TSO can reduce the
peak generation capacity investments. If energy storages are connected in distribu-
tion networks, it has an effect in grid topology as well as planning of the grid. In
some cases, DSO might be able to defer the investments for strengthening the grid.
[17]
The emergence of electric vehicles add another variable in the future’s outlook.
When the cost of the vehicles exceed certain point, i.e. it is beneficial in comparison
to combustion engine, the change can be quite rapid. A large scale roll-out have a
vast impact on the energy domain, which has to be solved in a very short time-frame.
2.5.3 Virtual Power Plant
Virtual Power Plant (VPP) is a concept where the energy production portfolio is
created from the small-scale energy production units, resulting the generator actor
from consumer-side. Usually the small-scale production’s output is too small to
be able to participate in wholesale electricity markets, so the production has to
be collected to form a larger entity, a VPP. Markets see the VPP as an normal
production unit, but in reality power plants location varies. This aspect makes the
VPP virtual: it is created from small fractions, but for markets purpose it can be
portrayed as an one large production unit.
Koeppel proposed the following definition of a VPP :
”VPP stands for a concept of combining different types of renewable and non-
renewable generators and storage devices to be able to appear on the market
as one power plant with a defined hourly output.” [48]
Two different types of VPP are identified: commercial and technical. The dif-
ference comes from the target market:
• Commercial Virtual Power Plant (CVPP) operates in wholesale markets. Rev-
enues come from produced energy and the geographical location of production
does not have any meaning whatsoever.
• Technical Virtual Power Plant (TVPP) offers ancillary services to system op-
erators in order to maintain the stability of the grid. The production units
should be in the same geographical area. [9]
VPPs ease the controllability challenges of the future if the DR, DG and energy
storages (ES) can be combined under one umbrella and control with reason, i.e.
production and consumption rates get the signal from either system-side or market-
side.
Also by gaining the market access and the benefits regarding it, it works as an
incentive for end-users to acquire more micro-generation. The public acceptance of
the new products is important, since VPP require certain critical mass before it can
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fully benefit from markets. This requires the controllability hand-over from end-
users own hands to some centralised actor, since at present DG is often controlled
by the owners themselves.
2.5.4 Smart Meters
European Commission has defined the common functional requirements for a Smart
meter. From the meter operators’ point of view, the meter should allow a remote
meter reading, providing the two-way communication between the meter and ex-
ternal networks for maintenance and control of the meter. It should also allow the
readings to be taken so frequently that the data can be used for network planning,
and enabling advanced tariff systems. [3]
The EU has mandated that 80% of households in the EU must have a smart
meter by 2020. [67] This is an ambitious target and it has been questioned whether
wanted effects can be achieved most efficiently through regulation.
Nevertheless, Automated Metering Management (AMM) provides crucial parts
of the Smart Grid philosophy. An old adage says ”You can’t manage what you
don’t measure.” This is exceptionally true when it comes to influencing the energy
consumption. Without the knowledge about electricity consumption, a customer
does not see the effects of its actions regarding energy efficiency. In Finland the roll-
out of the smart meters have been on their way already, and the meter measures
the hourly energy consumption and is able to take into account the end-users own
energy production. Collecting this information means that customer can start using
Demand Response, energy efficiency actions, energy storages and it lowers the bar
for micro-generation.
Technically AMM enables the possibilities. None of these expectations will be
realized without the active participation of the customer. The task of getting a
customer to genuinely change its energy usage is easier said than done. It will
require a comprehensive communication efforts in order to get a customer involved
in this process. Communicating these ideas to the end-user and point out that it is
worthwhile to participate will be the hardest task.
Innovative products are the key to increasing end-user participation. The start-
ing point of attracting people’s attention is that they are very passive about seeking
information. It has to be done as easy as possible for them to acquire information
on how to change the behaviour.
A good example is from a retail company Helsingin Energia, which has a web-
service called Sa¨vel+, where one can follow the energy consumption in different
time-scales, resolution ranging from a year to an hour. In Figure 5, an example
from the User Interface is shown.
The application does not provide the data in real-time, but in a few days delay.
The application also gives reference values to other houses with similar conditions,
and provides the comparison of end-user’s own consumption. It is first of its kind in
Finland, so there is room for improvements from ICT-perspective. Nevertheless, it
is a first step to the right direction and sets the starting point about the possibilities
in service sector. Many of the new services can be introduced only when a real-time
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Figure 5: Author’s energy consumption 21.10.2012 in Sa¨vel+ application. [32]
consumption data becomes available, dynamic tariffs for instance.
2.5.5 Demand Response
The price of electricity varies constantly in the wholesale markets, depending on the
amount of supply and demand at each moment but the retail customers usually see
flat priced electricity. The price signal does not come through from the markets, so
the customers do not have any incentive to change their electricity usage to more
reasonable, optimal way.
Before, this disconnection from market signals didn’t matter as much as now and
the flexibility for electricity systems came almost solely from the power production
side. Now with more rigidity in power production that renewables introduce and
the technology development in load control systems has brought up the Demand
Response as a potential solution in balancing the demand and the supply. [14]
2.5.6 Distributed Energy Resources
Term Distributed Energy Resources (DER)is a term that is used usually when there
is a need to emphasize the overall effects of the production and consumption in lieu
of only production. Generally DER consists all of the above: distributed generation,
energy storages, virtual power plant, demand response.
From the overall benefits of these new concepts, Shandurkova et al. [9] listed as
in Table 3.
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The following Table provides an extensive look on the potential benefits. It has
to be noted that there is no single way to implement DER. It is a complex concept
with vast amount of variables that are dependent on economical, regulated, political,
as well as technical development factors. The positive benefits have their boundaries
and certain requirements must be fulfilled before the full potential can be achieved.
More detailed briefing can be found in [9] and [17].
Table 3: Benefits from DER to different stakeholders. [9]
Stakeholder Benefit
Owner of DER
(prosumer)
Capturing the value of flexibility
Increased value of assets through the markets
Reduced financial risk through aggregation
Improved ability to negotiate commercial conditions
Network operators
TSO and DSO
Increased observation over DER for operation through aggre-
gation
Advantage gained from flexibility of DER for network man-
agement
Improved optimization of the grid investments
Improved coordination between DSO and TSO
Supplier and
aggregator
Creation of new offers for prosumers
Mitigating commercial risk
Policy makers
Cost effective large scale integration of renewable energies
while maintaining system security
Opening the energy markets for small scale participants
Increasing the global efficiency of the electrical power system
by capturing flexibility of DER
Facilitation of renewable targets and reduction of CO2 emis-
sions
Improvement of consumer’s choice
Society
DER will contribute to a more economically attractive elec-
tricity cost, thus contributing to a more competitive market
Improved power services, or reduced economic cost of current
services
Disruptions and cost of added transmission and distribution
infrastructure are delayed
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3 Electricity Markets
Electricity markets and its best conceivable structure has recently been under dis-
cussion. In the past the electricity was considered clearly to be a monopolistic
business, since the production has economies of scale and is very capital-intensive.
The delivery of electricity to the end-user is completely dependent on vast, expensive
transmission and distribution grid. These factors made the business to be controlled
by few large actors.
As the world has developed and the collaboration among countries has increased,
the electricity markets are pushed from national markets to larger entities. The po-
litical environment has also been intriguing driver for establishing transparent elec-
tricity markets. On one side, interest in re-arranging the public services has boosted
to form transparent market environment which would do innovative, market-based
solutions and find the balance through these mechanisms. Second, the integration
of all common internal markets have been a target for European Union. The de-
velopment of European electricity markets is influenced greatly by the new energy
policy of European Union. [18]
With liberalization of electricity markets, the product, electricity becomes a
commodity in the same way than for instance oil, grain or coffee. As in all the
other commodity markets, the outcome is the wholesale market and a retail market
with three usual players: producers, retailers and end-users. With electricity, a more
sophisticated trading pattern takes hold and new players emerge as well: the traders
and the brokers. [22]
Figure 6: Actors forming the electricity exchange. [22]
A trader is the entity which owns the electricity while the trading process is
running. How the electricity ends up to the end-user can have several routes, for
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instance trader can buy the electricity from the producer and sell it to the retailer,
or buy from retailer and sell it to another.
Brokers act as an intermediary player, negotiating purchases in return of a fee
or commission. A broker does not own the asset itself. A retailer can ask the broker
to find a producer who will sell given amount of electricity at given time.
3.1 Peculiarities of Electricity Markets
The electricity has very interesting characteristics in its very nature. The most
interesting oddity which distinguishes it from other commodity markets is that it
cannot be stored in large scale, at least not very cost-efficiently.
To some extent electricity can be stored for later use by using pumped-storage
hydroelectricity systems and furthermore the flow of water can be adjusted to some
extent to have more production at times of high consumption, but even with these
two exceptions, electricity is hardly comparable to other commodities like minerals
or oil for which the storage capacity is many orders of magnitude greater when
compared to the average volume of consumption. [25]
New kind of energy storages have been much of interest in energy business re-
cently but so far, the energy storages are in very early stage of R&D with lot of
uncertainty on when it will become feasible in large scale, or ever.
Since electricity cannot be stored, the demand and supply has to be in balance
every moment at given time. Consequently, demand and supply vary continuously.
Even small changes in load or generation can cause significant changes in prices.
This creates several underlying principles and explains many aspects we see in the
electricity field.
The next four sub-chapters will examine these principles.
3.1.1 Seasonality
Due to the real-time balancing and the cyclical demand the electricity prices are very
cyclical as well. This seasonal component is very dominant in electricity markets
and different patterns of it can be found in the timespan of a day, a week and a
year. [26]
Day-level and week-level differences arise from the pattern of how society works.
Yearly-level seasonality arise due to changing climate conditions, where the tem-
perature changes and amount of daylight set the pace to the demand. Depending
on what is the production structure markets, also supply-side experiences climatic
changes. For instance the Nordic market is very seasonally fluctuating in supply side
since the production has a vast amount of hydropower, which is heavily dependent
on amount of rain and snow melting.
3.1.2 Volatility
The volatility of market prices in energy markets is very high. It is completely in
different scale (100 – 500%) compared to currencies (10 – 20%), interest rates (10 –
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20%) or compared even to the volatility of stock rates of return (20 – 50% volatility).
This means that markets carry high risk to operate. [5]
This can be traced back to the lack of storages and transmission capacity. With-
out inventory short-term’s precise balancing is hard to achieve.
With more renewable energy, volatility is expected to rise even further because
of the difficulties in controlling the production level.
3.1.3 Mean reversion
In comparison with most financial markets, another fundamental difference in elec-
tricity markets is that it is mean-reverting. The term mean reversion is a concept
to describe a stochastic process which has a tendency to remain near, or tend to
return over time to a long run average value. [42]
The explanation for the mean reverting nature of the electricity spot prices get
into the marginal costs of production and demand fluctuation. When the electricity
demand increases, the generation facilities with higher marginal costs of energy
production emerge on the supply side, which pushes prices up. As the demand
decreases to normal levels the profitability of these this more expensive production
modules disappears and they will be turned off, resulting the prices to drop. This
kind of operating structure supports the thesis that there exists mean reversion in
electricity spot prices. Empirical studies show also that hourly electricity prices are
mean-revert around an specific hour mean level. [27]
3.1.4 Peak Prices
In addition to previous oddities, the electricity markets experience infrequent, un-
predictable peak prices. Price peaks can be a result from many different factors.
Weather can create a high demand, the system can experience outages in supply
side or scarce capacity can result in very high prices in certain areas. [28]
If the price is not restricted, negative prices can occur as well. RES’ generation
is made beneficial with subsidies, like the feed-in-tariff which guarantees certain
compensation level to its owner. This means that it is always beneficial to produce
electricity. Due to the operative costs of nuclear power plants, it is not preferable to
ramp down the generation for the short time periods. With this stiffness of energy
production, a situation might occur that the generation exceeds the demand and
causes the price of electricity to go to the negative side. In countries with significant
amount of RES, this has been experienced.
3.2 Nordic Electricity Markets
The Nordic electricity markets consists of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Es-
tonia and Lithuania. These previously national markets opened up for competition
in generation and retailing, and integrated into a single Nordic electricity market
between years 1991 and 2000 making them one of the first free electricity markets
in Europe. Estonia and Lithuania joined to the Nord Pool Spot in 2010. [22]
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The energy is traded in financial market NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe
and in physical energy exchange Nord Pool Spot AS. NASDAQ OMX Commodities
Europe offers the market place for derivatives contracts with different time scales,
from days up to six years. Financial instruments are used to manage risk and guar-
anteeing electricity’s price in the future. Nord Pool Spot AS provides the platform
for physical power trade. It operates on day-ahead markets, Elspot, as well as intra-
day market, Elbas. In Figure 7 the countries and the bidding area division of the
Nord Pool Spot Power Exchange are introduced.
Figure 7: Nordic electricity markets and the bidding areas. [31]
As mentioned, the Nordic electricity markets are one of the first free electricity
markets. Liberalization of the electricity markets means that vertically integrated
electric companies unbundle the transmission part, which is seen clearly as monopo-
listic business, and production as well as retailing to separate entities. Transmission
and distribution are strictly regulated entities in order to avoid misuse of monopoly
position. Generation and Retailing activities enter the open markets, which brings
them under competition. Competition makes the processes more effective and the
customer gets the benefits of enhanced situation. Unbundling is illustrated in Figure
8.
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Figure 8: From integrated electric utility to unbundled electricity market. Adjusted
from [53].
3.2.1 Elspot market
Elspot is a day-ahead closed auction where hourly power contracts are traded for
physical power delivery for every hour during the next day. The members place
their orders, hour by hour, to Nord Pool Spot’s web-based trading system, SESAM.
The orders can be sent up to 12 days ahead and the gate closure for the orders for
the next day is at 12:00 CET. [22]
Elspot is an ”energy-only” market, meaning that the exchange concerns only
energy (MWh) without taking into account the capacity (MW). When all the par-
ticipants have submitted the orders, the prices for every hour can be determined.
By combining different offers and bids, the supply and demand curve is formed, and
the intersection point between market and supply curves is the system price of the
current hour. Figure 9 illustrates the forming of a system price.
When calculating the system price, possible transmission capacity constraints
are neglected. In reality there is often restrictions in capacity between the areas,
and the Elspot market is divided to several price areas which are formed by taking
the actual transmission capacity into account. [22]
3.2.2 Elbas market
The adjustment market Elbas is a continuous intra-day market including the Nordic
region, Germany and Estonia. Elbas functions as a balancing market for Elspot: it
has an important role for risk reduction as well as provides the potential for making
profit. The balancing trades can be done until one hour prior to the delivery. Elbas
markets offers the alternative solution to minimise participants’ imbalances after the
gate closure of a day-ahead markets. Together with Elspot they create an efficient
Power Exchange structure.
Trading takes place every day and the markets stay open until one hour before
delivery. Price structure is based on first- come, first- served principle, lowest sell
price and highest buy price comes first, with no attention to when the order is
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Figure 9: Formation of a Spot-price. [22]
placed. [22]
3.2.3 Market competition
Even though the Nordic Markets have a lot of participants, according to Finnish
Competition Authority the market still has oligopolistic features. From production-
side, entering the markets is difficult since heavy investments are needed in order
to achieve enough production to meet the minimum requirements for market par-
ticipation. Also the regulation obstacles for building new power plants are strict,
making it challenging to build new generation. [6]
Although some remarks about competition, a general opinion is that electricity
markets in Nordics work well. Nordic electricity markets are fragmented among large
amount of players, introducing the competition to the energy domain. In Figure 10
the dispersion of different parts of Nordic electricity business is illustrated. With
fragmentation, it is more difficult for a single actor to affect the price of electricity
by its actions.
This has not been the case previously. Before, every national markets were
dominated by one large player, for instance Vattenfall had over 50 % market share
in Sweden before uniting the national markets to one entity. Now, with integrated
markets, the combined market share of 4 largest producers is close to 50 % (See
Figure 10). From competition standpoint, Nordics are close to a single market. [30]
Over 70 % of electricity consumed in Nordics is exchanged in Nord Pool, which
ensures the high liquidity of the markets. [22] Also the high volatility that has been
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Figure 10: Fragmentation of Nordic electricity markets. [68]
experienced in electricity prices is a sign that signal from changes in demand and
supply go through to the markets. From a social point of view, it is important
to ensure that the market prices reflect the production’s marginal costs. When
the system is dominated by hydropower, exploiting the market power is not easy
to detect, since generator has the possibility to either use or to store water in a
reservoir. This decision is made on factors such as forecasting of water levels and
length of winter season for instance. For outside observer it is hard to say whether
the decision is reflecting the use market power or expectations about future’s climatic
situations. [30]
The transparency requires that open competition is really happening, and the
amount of Over the Counter (OTC), bilateral agreements should be set under the
competition as well. Still, there are signs that market participants are still in unequal
position because of asymmetric information between large and small players. With
size comes benefits, the actors with large production or consumption resources have
more detailed and real-time data on the market compared to ones with more limited
resources. [28]
The gains from open competition model are seen as beneficial in the long run.
But in order to realize these gains, market has to monitor the situation whether the
open competition actually is happening. The barriers for entry both in generation
and retailing whereas bringing even more innovative actors has to be as low as
possible. [34]
3.2.4 Special characteristics of Nordic Electricity Markets
Nordic electricity markets have pioneered the unbundling of the generation and retail
business from the natural monopolistic infrastructure side. Before, the monopoly
rights and self-sufficiency requirements led to building excess capacity. The aim of
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the electricity market reform was to even the price differences in different regions,
add transparency to the markets and to remove the over capacity thus improving
the overall efficiency of the markets. [69]
Unbundling has brought the wanted effects: it has increased the competition on
both wholesale and the retail markets, causing the diminishing of the profit margins.
Also the overcapacity of production has been reduced, increasing the power industry
productivity.
Still, it has to be noted that even though positive developments in energy in-
dustry, the public opinion has been less enthusiastic about the electricity market
reform. Main reason for this has been the increased retail electricity taxes which
cause households to pay more for the electricity than before. Also the complexity of
the billing is seen as too complicated to understand. These are more external factors
and political decisions rather than a sign of badly functioning electricity markets,
but it is hard to communicate to large audience. [30]
Nordic electricity markets have certain characteristics in its structure. The struc-
ture has designed to be fitted in conditions Nordics have, but several aspects can be
adopted generally to other markets as well.
Four points is recognised why the Nordic electricity market has succeeded:
1. A simple but sound market design, to a large extent made possible by the
large share of hydropower.
2. Successful dilution of market power, attained by the integration of the four
national markets into a single Nordic market.
3. Strong political support for a market-based electricity supply system.
4. Voluntary, informal commitment to public service by the power industry. [30]
Points 1 and 4 are characteristics of Nordic society, but the other two points are
general and worth striving for in other markets as well. Next, the short comments
about the characteristics follows.
Figure 11 shows that in Nordics there are vast amount of hydropower, which is
not usual in other parts of Europe.
Main difference to the situation in Europe is that hydropower-dominant electric-
ity systems tend to be energy-constrained rather than capacity-constrained. The
level of water reservoirs, which work as a ”electricity storage”, is the essential fea-
ture in the system rather than amount of production capacity. With cold winters
the electricity consumption varies more in the Nordic countries compared to the sit-
uation in Europe. This has required to build a strong network in the first place. The
whole approach for the situation is different, since only lately with DER, there has
been increasing pressure for grid strengthening in Europe. Hydropower has many
useful characteristics in it. In comparison to fossil fueled power plants, the start-up
costs of power plants are insignificant, which in turn gives the right signals for the
efficient allocation of resources.
Point 4, the power industry’s voluntary commitment to public service, is also
seen as area-specific for Nordic countries. The atmosphere around the electricity
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Figure 11: Nordic Power Generation. [68]
environment is still careful among the actors, with fear that if there will be scandals
concerning using market power, it will create more regulations and the change the
direction back to the regulated, old system. [30]
The general points from the Nordic experiment that can be implemented to larger
scale are quite self-explanatory: Dilution of market power as well as continuing
political support with courage to stand behind the long-term strategical decisions.
For Nordic market, the unbundling has brought the situation what was pursued.
It has decreased the amount of unused capacity to the markets. Overcapacity doesn’t
exist anymore, there has been a few minor power shortages but so far the markets
have been able to take care of it. [33]
3.3 Roles of Different Players
3.3.1 Generator
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines the generator as
”A regulated or non-regulated entity (depending upon the industry structure)
that operates and maintains existing generating plants. The generation com-
pany may own the generation plants or interact with the short-term market
on behalf of plant owners. In the context of restructuring the market for
electricity, the generation company is sometimes used to describe a specialized
”marketer” for the generating plants formerly owned by a vertically-integrated
utility.” [41]
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3.3.2 Transmission System Operator
TSO is an actor who is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the High
Voltage Electricity Transmission System. This carries power from central power
stations to the Distribution System, where responsibility transfers to the distribution
system operator (DSO). The business is regulated due to its natural monopolistic
nature.
Transmission System Operator is the backbone of the whole electricity system.
It is responsible of maintaining the physical electricity delivery. Nordic Energy
Regulators (NordREG) [15] identifies the core tasks of TSOs accordingly:
1. Ensure the operational security of the power system
2. Maintain the momentary balance between demand and supply
3. Ensure and maintain adequacy of the transmission system in the long term
4. Enhance efficient functioning of the electricity market
Apart from these common core tasks, TSOs may have some other duties that
are not included in these tasks about system responsibility, depending on different
legislations in different countries.
NordREG have defined that TSOs act in three different roles in the Nordic
electricity framework. They are as follows:
• Transmission operator
• System operator
• Balance settlement responsible
Transmission operator is responsible for tasks 1. and 2. Task 3. is fulfilled when
TSO works as a system operator. The task 4. concerns all of the roles introduced.
[15]
Other important tasks are to secure the functional, transparent and open elec-
tricity markets.
3.3.3 Distribution System Operator
Distribution system operator (DSO) manages and operates a distribution network
for energy (electricity, gas, heat) or water. DSO transports the electricity through
high voltage, medium voltage and low voltage distribution systems. In the compet-
itive electricity market the distribution of electricity is usually a natural monopoly
controlled by the regulating authorities. [47]
The DSO has a central role as a neutral market facilitator, ensuring the functional
markets by securing the stability of the network system. Through the platform the
DSO maintains, customers benefit from the offering of the open markets where the
commercial players are in competition.
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3.3.4 Retailer
Retailer is an actor in the competitive electricity market that connects retail market
customers with the wholesale market. A retailer in electricity domain acquires the
electricity from the wholesale markets and then sells it forward to the customers
with a profit. Because the electricity is acquired from the power exchange (PX)
day before the customers’ forecasted consumption, the retailer carries the risk of the
imbalances of the bought and sold electricity.
As the electricity world is in transition to more complex structure, retailer can
offer also services with energy saving schemes as well as adding renewable energy to
the small customers.
3.3.5 Customer
A customer has a contract with a retailer, who provides the electricity needed. A
customer may or may not be the consumer of the electricity, but usually with a
customer, it is implied that he usually is the end-user of a commodity electricity.
They are the users of the energy supplied and do not pass it on to further customers.
3.3.6 Balance Responsible Party
Each party operating in the electricity market must take continuous care of its power
balance, i.e. the party must maintain a continuous power balance between its elec-
tricity production/procurement and consumption/sales. In practice, an electricity
market party cannot do this by itself, which is why it must have an open supplier
which balances the power balance of the party. In Finland, a party whose open
supplier is Fingrid is referred to as a balance responsible party (BRP).
The open delivery between Fingrid and a BRP is agreed upon through a balance
service agreement, whose terms are public and equal to all. Upon signing the balance
service agreement, the balance responsible party obtains the open electricity delivery
and also the services related to imbalance settlement between the balance responsible
party and Fingrid as well as an opportunity to participate in the balancing power
market. [66]
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4 Future Trends of Energy Markets
In order to analyse the changes to the players’ roles and responsibilities, the drivers
for the future development has to be introduced. In this Section there’s an outlook
for the integration in European level and new, emerging players are introduced.
4.1 European electricity market integration
The European Union concentrates on creating the integrated, internal energy mar-
kets. The designed market structure would include flexibility and higher trans-
parency compared to the situation nowadays. It is needed to ensure a favourable
and secure energy supplies for industry and households, as well as to tackle the
climate and energy challenges. European Union’s Energy Strategy aims to fully in-
tegrate the different energy markets into one by the end of 2014. By combining the
fragmented markets into one entity promotes better competition, better products
and results in more secure supply. [70]
Initial integration is in target at 2014, but longer time scale scenarios are exam-
ined as well. Designing the functional market for Europe, the following aspects are
seen as important features to be taken into account:
• Over-all system costs
• Volatility in the electricity prices
• Generation mix
• Geographic location of generation and demand
• Effects on network expansion
• Demand response
• Trade-off between market risk and regulatory risk [63]
The increase of renewable production creates the change in the generation mix.
More volatility is introduced and it is to consider whether it is possible to rely on
renewables due to its intermittent nature. Intermittency creates the situation where
it is needed to build an excess capacity to secure the required level of security of
supply. Large volatility in generation levels puts the transmission network under
stress.
As there is excess capacity of renewables with low marginal costs, it presses down
the price of electricity, causing the traditional power plants investments’ payback
times to grow, thus making them less attractive.
As seen, two crucial challenges have been identified concerning the capacity of
distribution network and the generation structure. Moreover, intermittency result
to more volatile electricity prices. This is a fact that is hard to explain to the public
opinion and media since electricity is seen as a commodity which is assumed to have
little variation on its price.
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Public opinion and media attention towards electricity has significant impact
when deciding the target model. If there is a consensus that volatility of the elec-
tricity prices is not acceptable, political decision can steer the market model to
less optimal, but less volatile situation. How the electricity markets evolve depend
greatly from policy-makers. [63]
4.1.1 Market models
Different market models can be created by taking different aspects into account, e.g.
price formation, regulatory decisions, level of competition. Usually two different
market models are introduced by taking the focus on the network capacity. The
question on how well the system is capable to respond to demand of the market is
crucial. EU’s strategy at the moment is to build a market platform which enhances
the competition over different nations’ borders, which means vast investments to the
transmission networks. Another option is that markets adapt to the transmission
capacity. In Figure 12 the main differences of two scenarios are depicted.
Figure 12: Proposed models for markets. Left, Open markets (Scenario 1) and on
right, Capacity markets (Scenario 2). [18]
The transmission capacity is the determining factor between the models. If there
is enough network investment plans, the markets can be integrated in such a way that
there is no restrictions among areas, thus making the open market model possible.
Without strengthening the network, it becomes a bottleneck which the market has to
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adapt to. This implies to the possible power shortages, where capacity markets try
to bring relief by building additional power capacity. Both scenarios are described
in more detail in the next sections.
4.1.2 Open markets (Scenario 1)
Vision of Scenario 1 potential relies mainly to two things: the sufficiency of transmis-
sion capacity and the active engaging of the demand side. These two factors open
the free competition in the electricity markets. Without bottlenecks in a transmis-
sion network a large price areas can be formed, equalizing the price of electricity
in large areas. The need for regulation is carried out reactively, as the areas are so
vast, the risk for exploiting the market power diminishes through increased number
of competitors in wholesale markets.
With active demand side management the price setting power from the genera-
tors is limited, causing more optimal allocation of generation resources. This leads
to a correct marginal costs from production to reflect in market price.
In Scenario 1, the price calculating method is different from the Scenario 2.
TSOs are responsible to provide information about available transmission capacity,
and the Power Exchange creates the price from the sale and purchase orders. [18]
4.1.3 Capacity markets (Scenario 2)
Another scenario forms when there is constraints in the transmission system. Con-
straints split the markets to small fragments, separate networks with generation and
consumption of electricity. This causes the price of electricity to vary locally, mean-
ing that the regulation differs from the Scenario 1. Locational marginal pricing poses
a threat to a use of a market power. This means that the need for market regulation
is much more strict to avoid the misuse of positions. In nodal pricing model the
generator’s bids are monitored and the prices of electricity are usually restricted to
certain limits. Restricting price can be a questionable act, since the high electricity
prices give the signal for the need for more production capacity. With restriction
this signal doesn’t come through to the markets, and alternatives are sought from
other solutions. For instance, there can be a separate capacity markets, which guar-
antees more investments to the new capacity, and the generators get compensation
for its existence, whether it is used or not.
Another problem which comes with price restrictions is the losing incentive for
demand flexibility. If the price does not go through correctly, there is no need for
curtailing the electricity when there is a scarcity in generation. [18]
There is a danger that markets are not liquid and transparent and in addition the
integration of different markets suffer when these kind of instruments are taken in
use, even though there would be more transmission capacity planned in the future.
European Commission has taken a stand against this. Some of the Member States
have introduced a plan to initiate these plans for securing the sufficient generation
capacity through alternative instruments than ”energy-only”-markets, i.e. initiat-
ing capacity markets. European Commission sees that if the capacity mechanisms
are not designed well, are introduced prematurely and without satisfactory level of
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co-operation at EU-level, there is an ample risk of distorting the optimal market
situation, bringing counter-productivity to the markets. [70]
Effects of capacity markets have been debated mainly qualitatively, but also
simplified scenarios with quantitative analysis have been introduced. Two differ-
ent alternative cases has been taken into account: EU-wide capacity markets and
capacity markets only in Germany. [72]
EU-wide capacity market vs capacity market only in Germany
In Figure 13 the comparison between the base case (no capacity markets) and EU-
wide capacity markets is presented. As it is seen, the nature of capacity installed
has to be such that it provides the secure generation when it is needed. Additional
capacity that is needed to be installed would be conventional energy production,
which is against the targets of the EU’s 20-20-20-plans.
Figure 13: Effect of capacity markets in EU-level. [72]
Energy demand is expected to experience only modest increase in European level
by the year 2020. Additional power capacity for the sake of keeping the prices even
is not what would be optimal from the society perspective, nor is the will of EU’s
strategy.
In Figure 14 the comparison of capacity market in EU and only in Germany is
shown, from Germany’s point of view.
As the Figure suggests, that introducing the capacity markets to whole Europe,
looking at the pattern of exports and imports it would not have radical effects, but
it would result in some changes in power flows, for instance the Netherlands would
change from net importer to net exporter. If the capacity markets are adopted only
in Germany, it starts to have an effect to the patterns. There would be a significant
changes in imports and exports patterns, leading to a significant increase in exports,
which implicates larger revenues for the German generators. From Nordic point
of view, the exporting to Central Europe diminishes slightly, resulting in reduced
system price in Nord Pool Spot.
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Figure 14: Impact of capacity markets in cross-border flows. [72]
In summary, threats and opportunities about the possible effects of capacity
markets are introduced in Table 4:
4.2 New Stakeholders in the Energy Markets
As there is a trend of adding more DER, making the generation structure more
inflexible in addition of more automation and ICT provided inside the energy system,
new players emerge to answer the needs of changed environment. In this section the
most prominent new stakeholders are introduced. The potential for these players is
high, changing the outlook of the business.
4.2.1 Prosumers
As one of the most prominent changes in the electricity business is the uprising of
renewable energy sources and distributed generation’s role in a sustainable solution
to the energy field. Political support has ignited the small scale production to be
more profitable.
This has big impacts on the role of the consumer as we know it. Incentives for
renewable energy sources in addition to price drop of the renewable technologies, a
small consumer, household, can start to produce its own energy and even become a
producer with excess production.
30
Table 4: Challenges and opportunities of capacity markets. [71]
Threat Opportunity
Regulation Investments do not depend on the
markets
Safer-income helps to fund invest-
ments
Market integra-
tion
Different systems in different
countries, distorting competition
and reducing efficiency
Incentives are already national
Demand flexibil-
ity
Larger proportion of fixed costs
and more consistent prices
doesn’t provide incentives for DR
Fixed payment beforehand can
enable demand flexibility
Competitiveness Chances for inefficient markets,
expensive for customers
Can allow new players in the field
Loss of the ex-
change liquidity
Larger proportion of fixed income
reduces the incentive to hedge
Smoother rates reduces the need
for hedging
With own production, the consumer’s role turns into two-folded: a consumer is
both on demand and supply side. This new emerging term a ”prosumer” can be
defined as an economically motivated entity that:
• Consumes, produces, and stores electricity and energy in general.
• Optimizes the economic and to some extent the technological, environmental
decisions regarding its energy utilization.
• Becomes actively involved in the value creating effort of an electricity or energy
service of some kind. [9]
Today, the role of the energy-producing consumer is still a new phenomena and
very limited in scale as well as importance. Nevertheless, large-scale deployment
of prosumers can happen quite rapidly so it is of great importance to examine the
effects proactively.
Questions arise about the role of this newcomer in the energy environment, where
large companies play a dominant role. The concept is not easy to position in the
value chain of the complex energy markets. In Figure 15 the value network where a
prosumer has to operate is illustrated.
The main challenge is to monetize this small-scale production. In order to bring
the benefits from the concept, intelligent energy-management services has to be
designed and developed in this constantly changing, uncertain value network. The
basic starting point for the service design is that it should create value both to the
customer and the other actors connected to it. [16]
It is not as straight-forward as it might sound, since there are several barriers
concerning regulatory and technical issues such as what kind of systems are used to
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Figure 15: Prosumer in a complex value network. [16]
determine the consumption and production, whether netting of the values are used
or are they measured separately. [49]
Another aspect to notice is that the prosumer is quite small considering the
energy and power it can produce. A single prosumer cannot participate to wholesale
markets very efficiently since the asset from single microgeneration plant is very
marginal. Alone it doesn’t have very much benefit but if there would be an actor
that can collect this excess power from a mass of prosumers, it starts to matter.
This is where the so called aggregator concept is seen useful, which is discussed in
the next chapter.
4.2.2 Aggregator
The concept of an aggregator tries to activate the demand-side which helps to solve
the fundamental problems that are connected to the nature of the electricity: stor-
aging and flexibility.
An aggregator collects the customers’ demand flexibility and excess generation
of electricity, optimises the electricity usage behaviour, and offers these resources to
the market. Ika¨heimo et al. [45] defines aggregation as
”An aggregator is a company who acts as inter-mediator between electricity
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end-users, who provide distributed energy resources, and those power system
participants who wish to exploit these services.”
From collected small-scale production and demand flexibility an aggregator can
create a Virtual Power Plant (VPP), through which the resources can be centrally
controlled. Centralised control enables the optimal use of the resources.
In order for aggregation for small-scale to take on hold, an aggregator has to
consider many practical aspects when designing the service it offers. An aggregator
has to have a vision about
• Customer segments, which can provide the needed distributed energy resources
(DER) and demand response (DR).
• Knowledge about the customers’ load profiles and control responses.
• The nature of DR, understanding what is the need for it in different markets.
• Devices and ICT gateways what is needed to deliver the load control.
• Decision abot the contracts that will be offered for the customers, creating the
right incentives to attract the customers. [21]
An aggregator acts as an intermediate between the two different markets. The
difference to usual business models comes from the fact that the consumers, house-
holds, are the source of the asset that aggregator sells forward to its customers,
like the wholesale markets, TSOs, DSOs and retailers (if an aggregator is not re-
tailer himself). Unlike in normal business, the relationship to the customers (TSO,
DSO, markets) is not significant but the marketing effort is done in supplier side,
i.e. end-users of electricity. Figure 16 clarifies this exceptional business logic of an
aggregator.
Looking at the latest disruptive services that have re-defined the business world,
the main idea has been to create a platform that links together two distinct groups
of users. For instance Google joins together web users and advertisers. These
two-sided networks are called platforms. Two-sided networks differ from traditional
market places in a fundamental way. In the traditional value chain the value has one
direction. In the two-sided networks, cost and revenue can move to both directions,
because the platform has a distinctive groups on both sides. The platform gets costs
on serving both groups but it is also able to collect revenue from both sides. [12]
This is what an aggregator brings to the electricity world as well. The intriguing
difference to present situation is that energy and revenue doesn’t flow anymore only
from consumers to other participants, but the flows can change direction, according
to the market situation.
So far, the aggregator companies has been in such a small scale that real-life
examples from the subject remain unseen. Another large change to the markets
is the introduction of demand flexibility. In the future electricity markets face the
question that are there bids for both supply and demand, or is the demand taken
as a constant, determined on the basis of a load forecasting program. When there
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Figure 16: Synthesis of the Aggregator’s Business Services, Clients and Providers.
[14]
starts to be a critical mass of participants, where the price of electricity affects to
the amount of demand the challenges occur. This flexibility affects to the Spot-
price because the demand and supply meet in different equilibrium than without
this flexibility.
Letting customers or aggregators enter bids for their demand gives them the
opportunity to indicate the value of their load in a more transparent way. There is
little experience of the subject with demand-side bids and therefore it is not clear
how this affect the actual behaviour of the consumers. [13]
4.2.3 Energy Service Company (ESCO)
Energy-efficiency is one of the three pillars in EU’s energy strategy. Cutting the
emissions from the end-use of energy, the benefits increase exponentially when going
back to the primary source. Energy saving potential still remain untapped, from
historical reasons there hasn’t been any pressure to optimise the energy-efficiency
until recently. As the energy-efficiency have become more popular the companies
which have in energy efficiency as their core business have emerged.
Energy Service Company (ESCO) is an interesting and important concept when
looking to the future. ESCO is specifically energy-oriented commercial business
that can help promoting the energy efficiency and offer its expertise in energy solu-
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tions such as energy savings projects, energy conversation and energy infrastructure
outsourcing.
Satchwell et al. [39] defines the ESCO as
”A company that provides energy-efficiency-related and other value-added
services and for which performance contracting is a core part of its energy-
efficiency services business. In a performance contract, the ESCO guarantees
energy and/or dollar savings for the project and ESCO compensation is there-
fore linked in some fashion to the performance of the project.”
The purpose of the ESCOs is to shift the focus from the unit of final energy (oil,
gas, electricity) towards the purpose or benefit that the final energy unit actually
produces and its optimisation (lowest cost of keeping the room warm, optimal air
ventilation timetables). [23]
ESCOs help and provide the tools for the customers to manage and influence
their energy consumption. The service portfolio can be quite vast, as it is seen in
Figure 17.
Figure 17: Possible service portfolio of ESCO. [9]
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5 Challenges and Possibilities
As any market has revolutionary transitions, roles and responsibilities of different
players experience redesigning to fit the new environment. New players emerge and
new roles are established. With proactive collaboration among participants, the
markets can find the optimal solution under new set of rules. When establishing
the roles, conflicts can occur among participants and some responsibilities are not
so easy to categorize under certain actor. The change can be managed smoothly
and without major frictions, but it is also possible that some of the new concepts,
such as load control and energy storages, have a large interest from several actors.
This might cause conflicting interests regarding them. Finding a solution that is
satisfactory for all the players can be hard to achieve.
By the same token, vast changes do not necessarily change the roles too much
and the threats for any actor can be trivial. Future’s uncertainty creates doubts
among players, but changes to environment usually brings unforeseen benefits for
all of the players.
In this section the challenges and possibilities for different actors are discussed,
as well as comments about changes of the market platform and the improvements
are suggested. The discussion for this Chapter come from the interviews of experts
in energy business, supported with literature studies.
5.1 Power Exchange
The traditional market platform faces challenges in a new environment. It has been
designed from the needs of traditional energy business aspect, where the amount of
energy produced were easier to predict, and products’ time granulation was designed
accordingly. EU’s energy strategy has been one of the main drivers for the European
market integration, a long process where the first steps have been taken. Creating
an integrated PX, which takes into account the new requirements of the system
platform and requires different PXs collaboration, is a long and difficult task.
5.1.1 Challenges
Potential loss of liquidity on the PXs
As there has been debates about the introduction of capacity markets to Europe,
the impacts for PXs and financial commodities exchange encounter a threat. With
larger proportion of fixed income, the incentive to hedge the electricity reduces. The
role of the PX can be questioned if the development is facing strongly to the old,
regulated markets direction. [71]
Difference in business objectives of PXs
Deciding the common goals for the PX is difficult, and one of the main reasons
is that PXs have different interests and views on business objectives. Lundin [65]
categorizes these as follows:
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• PX as a state institution and steering regulated by law – Run more like a part
of the government’s administration
• PX owned by TSO:s – Balance between business and public service interests
• Business entities owned by market stakeholders – Focus on business and what’s
in the interest of the participants
The ownership of the PX defines largely the business objectives of the platform.
As there is a variety of the different ownerships, it is seen problematic to start
forming the common targets. With different behaviour and the focus among PXs,
it is hard to find the solution that would be suitable for everyones’ needs.
Competition among PXs
Derived from the previous point, as it is not possible to find the satisfying solution
for everyone, different PXs are under competition situation where the strongest wins.
Competition hinders the collaboration for striving to integration of the PXs.
Disagreement about common PX’s structure
PX’s have a variety of different kind of structures for day-ahead markets, intra-day
markets as well as a variety of balancing mechanisms. The functionalities are not
easy to integrate, as different mechanisms have different benefits and restrictions.
PXs have biased view on what would be the optimal solution for the whole Europe.
First obstacle when discussing the coupling of the markets comes from designing
of the new product portfolio. It is hard to integrate the products with different time
periods that exist in different PXs now. Time resolutions for intra-day vary from 1
hour to 15 minutes, depending on PX.
15 minutes would be a radical shortening of the time resolution for the Nordic
market perspective where both day-ahead and intra-day markets have had an hour
granularity. Transmission system operator (TSO) has very accurate plans for con-
sumption and production, and by shortening the time-window would require more
resources on activating bids in Balancing market from TSOs point of view. A 15
minute period is radically short time period from actor’s perspective as well. It
leaves little time for actors to correct imbalances, resulting in full-time job to follow
the changes in Balancing market. [29]
Creating a trading mechanism for whole Europe
According to Lundin [65], the core challenge for PXs is the creation of the integrated
trading mechanism to whole of Europe. The calculation of the spot price and ref-
erence price, which covers all the areas and simultaneously takes into account the
capacity on all cross border allocation in one batch. The challenge is not a technical:
one price calculator for the Europe can be done technically. Problem is the lack of
interest to strive consolidation of the business forward at fast pace.
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5.1.2 Possibilities
Additions to product portfolio
The integration of the product portfolios requires work, but it has a possibility to
create the most suitable products, losing the historical burden on the design of the
tradition. By designing a well-structured and attractive product portfolio, it will
attract more actors to the platform, and thus making the field more transparent
and has a positive impact on PXs growth.
Benefits from European scale markets
PX has the possibility to find growth more easily if there is a pressure for the in-
tegration of the markets from the European Commission level. The expansion to
larger market area helps the coordination and gives better insight about the bottle-
necks in system, helping different TSOs’ collaboration on building the international
transmission lines.
5.2 Aggregator
Drivers for aggregator business vary from environment. In the USA it has been be-
cause of the bad infrastructure. Lately Germany started the ”energy turnaround”,
the term which includes the increasing amount of renewable energy, replacing con-
ventional energy sources and also phasing out nuclear power. [78]
For the Nordics, the pressure does not come from the infrastructure side nor
political decisions concerning the energy generation structure. A main driver for
the Nordics is in the market structure. In the Nordic market structure occasional
price peaks cause the driver for demand flexibility. [92]
Positioning of an aggregator in electricity markets depends from the assumptions
that verifies its existence. Two aspects are important to identify: which end-users
have enough potential to form the needed mass to build a service, and who are the
customers interested for buying the flexibility service.
As a new player, the role of an aggregator in the network is discussed in the next
subsection. After that the main challenges and possibilities for an aggregator are
introduced.
5.2.1 Establishing a place in Markets
Demand flexibility requires an aggregator to exploit its potential. The energy pro-
duction has economies of scale, but demand response has different idiosyncrasies. It
has to be built from small units in order to get the critical mass needed to make an
impact. By collecting these resources the electricity markets get a new actor, which
hasn’t been there before.
A new actor in the closed environment can cause confusion among players. How
to implement a new actor and its role in optimal way is under the debate. Existing
roles of different players have established over time and certain actors are regulated
with law (DSO, TSO), so an aggregator’s position in this environment is not clear
yet. [92]
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A possibility to become a market actor
An aggregator does not necessarily have to participate in electricity markets. It can
provide a service to the customer which optimizes the energy usage to be as cheap
as possible. The problem follows from the fact that optimizing, i.e. changing the
expected behaviour of a customer, has impacts on other players. By modifying the
customers’ load curves, an aggregator causes deviation to the consumption profiles.
A retailer has to forecast the profile beforehand, and deviation means additional
risks to the retailer. If an aggregator has this kind of business model, conflicts occur
without communication between players. Functional communication is essential to
make the business viable for an aggregator.
Other solution is where an aggregator provides the electricity to the customer,
i.e. becomes a retailer. When becoming the market actor, communication need
with a retailer disappears but now an aggregator is responsible for the balance sheet,
which brings new risks and challenges. This business model has its restrictions, since
retailer business is not the core competence nor focus for aggregator. Therefore, it
sounds logical that collaboration can bring more benefits to both players.
Strategic decision about customer segment
In different markets there are different potential clients to be found. A size of an
client can vary from large single industry player to small, single household with
electrical heating, with very different preferences and expectations from the service.
Market research is an essential task to do, to find the providers that can be flexible
enough. Market research is a long and complicated task to do properly. To find
processes that can be re-arranged more optimally will require deep understanding
from customer’s needs.
Strategic decision about choosing operating markets
Another strategic decision needed is the decision where an aggregator is operating.
Demand Response can be offered to several different markets, depending on the
nature of the flexibility possibilities in each load. Participation possibilities for
different markets range from Spot-markets to fast disturbance reserves.
Selection depends mainly from the time-slot in which the load can be turned
off without causing major disturbances to other processes, for instance the cooling
systems in cold storages have boundaries concerning the maximum temperature
allowed to keep food products fresh.
Another aspect when deciding the market is the reaction speed of the controlled
load. Markets that are related to power shortages can happen fast. For Balancing
markets the load reduction is required to be activated in 15 minutes’ time.
Of course, an aggregator can choose several different markets to operate, but it
requires effort and lots of automation to constantly update the highest value from
different possible markets.
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5.2.2 Challenges
Several challenges were discovered from the real-world implementations of aggrega-
tor. Based on interviews, the main problems are as follows.
Attracting clients
Attitudes of the clients whose loads could be controlled has proven to be mixed.
Main reason is difficulty to estimate exact savings it would bring to a client. Savings
volatility makes the pricing of the service difficult. Usually the loads are a part of
the processes that are delayed because of the DR. If one cannot estimate the savings,
comparison of a trade-off of this action cannot be done.
Clients also have popular misconception that the benefits are very small that
it isn’t worth executing. Argument for this can be based on arbitrage: if savings
through better adjustment of electricity usage is risk-free, a rational actor should
do it. [92]
For small-scale clients the challenges is that it is hard to reason the benefits
because of the lack of knowledge about electricity markets. Initial investment for
HEMS can be too high and payback times can prolong to several years, which
reduces the attractiveness of the product. Also the development of the systems are
rapid so one gets advantage to wait for a longer time. [86]
Communication with policy-makers
As the DR is such a new concept, getting regulation adapted to DR has been a
challenge. From traditional perspective, where the problems with grid stability
has been solved through big projects like building more transmission lines causes
certain mind-set to politicians. This new, capital efficient technology is not easy
to explain. Since it’s not easy to comprehend, policy-makers don’t understand to
create incentives for it, which in turn means that ancillary services do not seem so
attractive to actors under regulation. [78]
Existing player expands the business to aggregation
Existing actor in markets can begin to offer aggregation services, using the existing
customer base as an advantage. Retailer companies have an excellent possibility to
penetrate into aggregation: the business model doesn’t differ from an aggregator
who becomes a market actor.
5.2.3 Possibilities
Markets have a need for DR
Alongside with sufficient transmission capacity, price elastic demand is seen as of
crucial importance when creating the functioning markets. [18] The Nordic markets
is matured to the point that the next logical step for development is to thrive for
demand flexibility. There is clearly a demand for this kind of actor who collects the
flexibility from smaller fractions to larger units that can participate in markets.
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The markets is in need for this kind of service, but the system side is interested
as well. Demand flexibility can be exploited to problems from both sides: bringing
savings from markets to customers as well as bringing relief to congestion problems
that system will experience.
Shorter time resolution demands more automated systems
Inevitable shortening of the time granularity in markets makes aggregator even more
valuable via direct, automated load control. Price of flexibility increases, and since
the time window is so short, the inexperienced customers do not have resources to
follow the markets’ signal shifts fast enough. Through this scenario, it can be seen
that in future the demand for dynamic tariff combined with direct load control gains
interest. Absence of direct load control can lead to a situation which is unfair for
the customer. [80]
When considering the situation in a larger scale, the markets should be still
developed in such a way that flexibility both in demand and generation are still
mainly in the day-ahead wholesale markets. The challenges from the DER makes
the requirement hard. Thus, when forecasting accuracy weakens, it makes the job
for Balancing Responsible Party even harder, opening possibilities for an intra-day
aggregator at the same time. [73]
Prosumers need an aggregator for market participation
The customers with own production as well as possibility to have flexibility in con-
sumption cannot participate in wholesale markets as such, since the amount of
energy is too little. These prosumers need an actor which collects the resources
together and bring them to the markets. A need for an aggregator grows as the
small-scale generation becomes more and more popular.
5.3 Retailer
Retailer encounters challenges from the changing of the business environment in form
of the increasing competition and strategy re-evaluations. With integration of ICT,
a vast spectrum of possibilities what the retailer can do outside from the traditional
focus. At present the core business is a risk management in the wholesale markets,
in future the focus can turn to more customer-centric solutions, ranging from energy-
efficiency to promoting the customer’s own renewable energy production.
5.3.1 Challenges
AMM enables dynamic tariffs
In Finland, the Smart meters are installed which provide the data about the con-
sumption every hour. This has a major impact on the retail markets. Meters enable
the real-time, dynamic tariff. If the tariff becomes more popular, the pricing of the
electricity becomes very straight-forward, leaving little possibilities to compete with
margins. This gives pressure to the retailers to expand the business to other sectors,
such as service-providers.[69]
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Competition increases
ICT enables more active customer participation with better understanding on how
the energy is consumed. There are different ways to increase the energy efficiency
which brings new participants in the markets, such as companies specialised in Home
Energy Management Systems (HEMS) and ESCOs.
Emergence of the new players mean that the competition from customers tight-
ens. There will be new competitors outside from the traditional electricity retail
sector. Trend is that retailers become more of a service providers, which help cus-
tomers to save energy through collaboration. [80]
Retailers stretch out from their present core business, which is acquiring the
electricity from wholesale market and selling it to customers.
Moving away from the comfort zone
Since the nature of the business evolves, the retailer has to update the strategy
accordingly. If the scenario is not well known, choosing the right strategy results
in profits and by choosing the wrong focus on strategy risks the whole business.
Analysis of the future and innovativeness is of high value when deciding the winners
out of the market change.
If the strategy change involves more emphasis on the creation of the services to
the end-users, the retailer has to adapt new ways of working, without the previous
experience. Seminal changes to strategy has to be evaluated carefully, and companies
with a long history might be uncomfortable to update the procedures. Reluctance to
undergo a transformation may result in losing the business to more agile companies.
5.3.2 Possibilities
Easier to differentiate from competitors
With more options in possible strategies create an advantage. It is easier to differ-
entiate own business from other service providers, by creating services to the certain
segment. By creating differentiation of products successfully, a retailer can achieve
monopolistic nature in certain segment, where perfect substitutes for the service are
hard to find.
Collaboration with other sectors
Retailers have a vast experience from electricity markets’ behaviour. Collaboration
with a company which has different core business can create advantages to both
players, an alternative solution to expanding too much to new areas [73].
First steps in collaboration has been made recently. Fortum’s collaboration with
There corporation, which manufactures HEMS, Fortum has been able to create a new
product, Fortum Fiksu. In this solution, There-corporation provides the hardware
solutions for controlling the loads and Fortum provides the Spot-priced electricity
contract. Through synergy a customer gets a service which decreases the electricity
invoice by optimising the heating load usage. [38]
Benefits from collaboration can go much further. Creating new products and
doing market research requires investments. Collaboration helps to share the R&D
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costs, thus increasing the possibilities to research the projects that would have been
too expensive for one player to carry out. [79]
Product portfolio increases
Creating services becomes easier by exploiting the data from AMM. Retailer is
provided with more detailed data on customer’s behaviour. The retailer is able to
create more detailed picture of customers needs, which lead to a variety of different
products and services. Larger product portfolio enables the business growth and
provides larger customer base with more competitive products.
5.4 DSO
Changes in environment affects the DSO as well. Inflexibility in production side will
make the stability of the grid more difficult to manage. The transition from passive,
solving situations by grid investments approach towards more ICT-centric business
has impacts for the regulated, neutral player as well.
5.4.1 Changes in the role
Because of the natural monopoly, DSO’s business is regulated. Regulation causes
restrictions and limits in its role. The revenues are fixed and the participation to
the electricity markets is not possible.
DSO is seen as a neutral market facilitator, enabling the platform for the func-
tional electricity markets. A Smart Grid have a lot of components that can be used
in the open markets, like energy storages and DR, so the Smart Grid has to be
seen more than just a technical infrastructure managed by the DSOs. General view
is that the role of DSO should remain as a neutral actor after enabling a Smart
Grid. DSO should be kept separate from open markets. DSO provides the platform
for competitive players to offer new services. New services should be created by the
market and the regulatory framework should support the market-oriented approach.
[62]
However, in areas where there are already significant amount of renewable energy
production, ideas for updating the DSOs role to more active approach has emerged.
DER causes DSOs to reinforce the grid connections in order to secure the grid
stability. Grid has to be designed according to the peak load, which might in
some cases happen only a few times a year. If the peak hours do not happen very
frequently, it would be beneficial to avoid the congestion situations by using the
flexibility services rather than investing more to the grid.
It is discussed that if DSO has more options in managing the production or
consumption of electricity, it could optimise the investments to the grid more effi-
ciently. For instance, DSO could acquire DER services from the open markets. A
new market platform would be created for aggregation services and price will form
transparently, whether it is signal from markets or from the system level. Com-
mercial players offer the services to TSOs and DSOs as pictured in Table 5. This
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concept is market driven and based on voluntariness, with benefit of creating new
business potentials to energy environment. [61]
Table 5: Roles of different actors in flexibility service model. [61]
Actor Role
TSO Demander of flexibility services
DSOs Demander of flexibility services
Commercial players (Retail-
ers, aggregators etc.)
Supplier of flexibility services (Through aggrega-
tion of Consumer / DER resources)
Consumers / DERs Supplier of flexibility services
Market platform for flexibility services has certain aspects that need to be con-
sidered and clarified before implementing. Possible challenges about the viability of
the concept can be enlightened with following examples.
Players have unequal power position
If DSO rely on the flexibility markets and do not invest to the grid, it can result a
situation where the supplier of flexibility services can put unnaturally high value to
the service, since DSO has no choice but to buy it anyway in order to secure the
distribution grid stability.
By the same token, DSO can also use power position and avoid participation for
this kind of market model completely. It is stated by law that if security of supply is
at stake, the DSO has a right to drop the loads in order to secure the stability. Thus,
if DSO can affect to the flexibility itself, it reduces the need to use the flexibility
markets.
Flexibility markets do not have desired effects to network planning
DSO is seen as a potential customer for this kind of service, as with the working
flexibility markets the DSO can change the network planning to more intelligent
direction, deferring the grid investments through load shifting.
A threat is that even though DSO has interest in flexibility services, the practices
of long-term network planning may remain unchanged. The distribution grid is still
planned according to ”fit-and-forget” approach, meaning that it is fitted to take care
of occurring peak power. The distribution network is planned for decades forward.
The planning cannot trust too much for the demand flexibility. The voluntariness
of the flexibility makes it even harder to build trust for grid planning.
Moreover, the model does not take into account the factors related to capacity
requirements of the grid. The capacity built depends on a variety of factors: ade-
quate capacity to handle the power peak is just one of them. The safety in fault
occasions and special situations such as transformer failures have an effect to the
grid planning as well. [96]
The reasons mentioned suggests that planning will be done with an assumption
of no intelligence in the grid. Without exploiting the intelligence of Smart Grid
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concept the benefits are just marginal, if any. If planning tools do not develop, it
continues to be business as usual.
A farrago of signals may result in unoptimised controls
The system becomes easily very complex when there are several signals from different
sources. Signals can have opposite effects. The overall optimisation and the price-
calculation in real-time can become obstacles.
For example, if the price forms in open markets, the DSO has calculated that at
certain price range it is cheaper to use the flexibility service rather than strength-
ening the grid. TSO has made the same calculation and has its own price range.
Electricity markets create a third price range for the parties offering the service.
Problem arises if these three prices conflict, i.e. everyone has an exigent need for
the service at the same time. Therefore the price may get so high that it is not
profitable any more, but since the need for it is crucial the service has to be bought
no matter the cost. Strengthening the grid would have been cheaper in the first
place.
In order to make DSO believe that flexibility markets are relevant is to create a
guarantee that DSO has the service available when needed. A privilege certificate
to the service over others’ signals can build trust to this concept. Otherwise there
is a danger that the flexibility markets will never happen.
The implementation takes too long
There is a justified doubt for ancillary service markets’ development pace. A fear is
that at the time when these smart solutions will be available, they are not required
anymore for generation management, because the grid is enhanced already.
Also the readiness of DSOs to penetrate to more active role is questionable.
According to Tenschert [97], DSOs in Austria (which can be expanded to other
countries where DSOs are already experiencing the effects of DER) are presently not
ready to become active players on energy issues or even ancillary services. Austria
has rather strong regulation system and therefore professional resources at DSOs
in this respect are not available because of cost restrictions. In practice it seems
more important to talk about the solutions of today and of tomorrow. It is too
much discussed about the days after tomorrow. Of course we must think about
after tomorrow, but before we have to solve today and tomorrow.
5.4.2 Challenges
Data management
The main challenge is the managing and distributing the data, which now has be-
come a relevant part of the DSO’s business through new regulation. In Finland
the DSOs are responsible for acquiring, storing and delivering the data from Smart
Meters to other market parties. It is a completely new function for the DSOs. After
the acquiring the data, it has to be verified. The system built has to be very reliable,
since the mistakes and flaws become very costly: retailers’ and DSOs’ billing rely
on the data acquired. [85]
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Tariff structuring
The present tariff structure for the DSO does not reflect the actual costs. It should
be changed from energy-based structure to power-based. As a solution for this the
”bandwidth”-tariff has been introduced, where the customers pay for the maximum
capacity they use. This system has been criticized for not taking the energy-saving
aspect into consideration, and also that if it would be introduced in a short transition
time, the price differences in the electricity invoices would be too radical for some
customers. [85]
It has also to be noted that if the signals come from both the markets and the
system level, the signals can be conflicting. There can be a problem that customer
can have mixed signals and does not understand what to do. This confusion can
lead to unwanted behaviour, even though the idea was initially to have better overall
optimisation for society.
Further in the future when micro-generation has a significant part in energy-mix,
with more own production, there is a possibility that the grid is used more in a way
of a ”battery”, and net energy consumption can become quite small. This is a risk
for DSOs to lose their revenue if the tariffs take account only energy consumption.
One solution how to get the tariffs closer to the equivalent of reality is to change
them to power broadband tariffs. Then the strengthening investments are directed
to the customers who actually demand it. [79], [19]
5.4.3 Possibilities
Better knowledge from the situation on the grid
Data collecting also means a lot of opportunities for the DSOs. By knowing the
consumption more accurately and better knowledge on how the power flows move
will give more detailed picture of the state of the grid. Knowledge helps DSOs to
develop their own processes more effectively. The real-time state helps to ease the
stress on bottle-necks. In addition, data brings long-term benefits as well: better
and more accurate tools for the long-term planning can be created.
DSO as Market Facilitator
How the ICT infrastructures are integrated to the energy sector are currently under
debate. A common infrastructure for the information distribution, a data hub, which
all the players use can lead to a conclusion that the facilitation should be done by
a regulated entity, to avoid the misuse of the system.
It has been presented that DSO would function as a facilitator of this information
exchange. As a regulated entity DSOs would be able to act neutrally towards market
actors, securing functional platform where players operate in open competition. In
Figure 18 the overview of the model is presented.
Benefits from this would be that the platform would be facilitated still with
regulated entity, and at least in Finland it would be logical to keep the metering
activities as an DSOs responsibility since the roll-out of the smart meters and the
metering systems were done and chosen by DSOs. Also the roles for the other
players would remain more or less the same. The customer would participate in the
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Figure 18: ’DSO as Market Facilitator’ Market Model - High-level overview. [10]
electricity domain through commercial contracts and the retailers would be able to
focus on developing new services to the customers.
5.5 TSO
5.5.1 Challenges
Lobbying for the Nordic Market Model in Europe
On market perspective, the largest challenge for Fingrid is the ongoing European
Market integration. Although the European Commission’s target model for the
market integration is similar to Nordic market model, it has caused a lot of resistance
in European level, as it would require vast changes to existing market models. There
should be more drive to target model direction. [77]
Exploding reserve costs
The increasing amount of DER makes the system more volatile, especially in the
transition state where the electricity system has not adapted to the rapidly increasing
growth of intermittent wind power. A research [60] illustrates the scenario where
the price impacts from the wind power increase are unnaturally large because there
hasn’t been enough proactive investments to the Balancing power. Strong increase
in intermittent renewable production, combined with phasing out of the old capacity
may lead to a situation, where the existing Nordic Balancing system is not able to
cover the possible fierce disturbances the system experiences.
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Communication Gateway with DSO
One segment that is important for TSOs in the future is to establish a working
communication gateway in Customer – DSO – TSO chain. There hasn’t been need
for this in the past but now there starts to be a pressure to communicate more
intensively. More collaboration among these stakeholders is needed in order to
communicate the signals on what is the state of the grid. [77]
5.5.2 Possibilities
More intelligent solutions are available instead of building reserve
Increasing flexibility in demand-side becomes of great use for the TSO. Adding
capacity cause monumental investments from TSO. In cases where the peak power
is used only a short time in a year, it would cause vast savings for TSO if these few
congestions could be handled through DR instead of building more capacity. DR
is a cost-efficient way of solving the reserve investments. Also energy storages are
explored to ease the problem. [86]
More variety in product portfolio
Variety of products can be designed, when new kind of production and flexibility is
brought to markets. It provides help to more specific kind of situations that TSOs
might encounter. Collaboration with an aggregator in service design can create
realisable service structures.
5.6 Generator
5.6.1 Challenges
DER subsidies distort the markets from optimal equilibrium
A generator sees the diminishing of the overall markets when DER starts to become
more popular. If the end-users produce the electricity themselves, the amount of
electricity bought from the wholesale markets starts to decrease.
The structure of electricity generation experiences negative impacts from DER
since the marginal costs of renewable energy are practically zero, if the renewable
energy is subsidized for example through feed-in tariffs. It leads to a situation
where it is always profitable to produce electricity, even when there is already excess
amount of electricity in the markets. In Figure 19 the graph of supply structure is
shown.
When there is a sunny and windy day, it pushes the whole supply curve to the
right. This becomes challenging if the system starts to have a significant amount of
renewable energy generation. In case where the DER generator is not exposed to
real market price, the supply might increase so much that it forces normal base load
power plants to ramp down the production.
Either the renewable production should be constrained or the base load plant’s
production. Logically it should be DER since with renewable energy power plants
the control is easier, when as nuclear plant’s response takes more time. The peaks
from wind or solar can escalate quickly, within an hour or even less which can be
48
Figure 19: Renewable generation effects. Increase of the renewable energy pushes
the supply curve to the right.
too short time for base load power plants to react. Therefore DER should have the
same incentive than others to adapt to market needs.
DER lowers the price of electricity in the wholesale markets
The Figure 20 shows the effect of DR and DG on the price formation in wholesale
markets. If the price difference is significant between hours, the flexibility of demand
shifts the consumption to cheaper hour, thus pushing demand curve more to the left.
Alongside with added DG, more production pushes the supply curve to the right.
These factors together push the price down, inflicting less revenue on generators.
5.6.2 Possibilities
Value of flexibility increases
The closer we get to the delivery hour, the less there is generation or load to be able
to react fast enough. If forecast accuracy weakens, it is not necessarily a negative
aspect for all generators.
Forecast weakening causes the value of flexibility to become even higher in future.
If the generator has a lot of easily controlled generation such as hydropower, the
fluctuation that DER introduces can be beneficial for the generator.
5.7 Customer
5.7.1 Challenges
Anxiety towards more accurate monitoring
From the market research [11] it was noted that people might experience the increase
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Figure 20: Effects of different techniques on price formation.
of monitoring as going to ”Big Brother watches you”-world. Many feel that in
modern society there is a lot of surveillance even in places that are not necessary
needed. It increases anxiety and adds more neurotic aspects to everyday life.
5.7.2 Possibilities
With more accurate data collecting, the customers will get new service offerings from
the retailers as well as the quality of services gets better, more focused, custom-made
services.
Monetary savings
It has been estimated that more detailed knowledge about the household consump-
tion, for instance by using the in-home displays, would bring up to 10 % annual
savings. [2]
With a smart meter it is possible to follow and adjust one’s energy usage, since
the data is based on real consumption rather than estimation of it. In future, the
customers are able to follow their electricity consumption in real time. In 2011 For-
tum started an in-house display-pilot, where households could follow their electricity
consumption in real-time. The separate device was installed to 180 households. The
customers’ reviews were positive, although it was seen that more functionalities, such
as device-specific measurements were needed in order to understand the electricity
50
consumption in more detail. [11]
Better products available
With ICT, it is possible to get more detailed data about the customer behaviour.
A retailer can use this data in order to do more focused, customised solutions for
different customer segments which take into account the exact wants and needs for
each customer type. [91]
5.8 Summary
When finding new roles for the actors in the field, more holistic perspective is needed.
Dialogue among players is important when it comes to finding an optimal solution,
meaning that resources are used as efficiently as possible from the society’s point of
view.
Every player undergoes challenges as well as experiences opportunities. In Table
6 the main opportunities and challenges are summarised for each actor.
Table 6: A main opportunity and a challenge for every shareholder.
Player Challenge Opportunity
PX Competition among PXs
hinders the common plat-
form development
Possibility to vast expan-
sion of the platform
Aggregator Difficulty to introduce new
concept in large scale
A need for demand flexibil-
ity
Retailer More competition in sector
from ICT-companies
Possibility to expand the
product portfolio
DSO Handling the data manage-
ment
Better tools and knowledge
from the grid through more
accurate data
TSO Exponentially growing re-
serve investments
More intelligent solutions
are available
Generator DER reduces marginal prof-
its
Flexible production can be-
come more valuable
Customer Anxiety towards more accu-
rate monitoring
Monetary savings & more
customised products
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6 Potential Conflicts of Interests
In this section the potential conflicts among players are reviewed. Many of them
appear from the reasons that were discussed in the previous chapter: from challenges
that stakeholders experience. Also an aggregator and a retailer overlap in certain
conflicts. This is because of the similarities: if an aggregator operates in wholesale
and in retail markets it has no difference whatsoever compared to the role of the
retailer.
Results have been acquired through interviews with industry experts, and evolved
ideas further for possible additional solutions to overcome the potential conflict sit-
uation.
Potential conflicts are structured as follows. First, the short definition about
the conflict is introduced, which is followed with more detailed description of the
problem. Last, possible evasive action around it is proposed.
6.1 Customer – DSO
6.1.1 DSOs quality of service may be compromised
The increase of DER lead to increased volatility in voltage levels and in worst case
can result in blackouts if the DSO cannot manage the local grid constraints accord-
ingly. Standard EN-50160 mandates the DSO to be responsible of securing electricity
availability to customer when needed. Due to the costs of grid expansions, quality
of service DSO offers may be compromised.
Discussion Standard EN-50160 defines the voltage parameters of electrical energy
in public distribution systems. It sets the quantitative values that service quality
must deliver, by making the evaluation of the power quality possible.
The requirements become more expensive to fulfil with intermittent DER. Net-
work reinforcements to integrate the new DG units are necessary, causing more costs
to the DSO.
If the generation location starts to move to the areas where there hasn’t been
generation before, conflicts may arise. The cable capacities is fitted to respond to
the old situation. Cables might not be able to adjust to the new power flows. DSO
has to re-evaluate its grid, since the situation can be that local congestions occur
when the local production is over the local consumption.
Also the variations in voltage increases, causing harm to customer’s devices.
Proposed Solutions As a regulated entity, the DSO has to provide certain quality
level of service. Strengthening the grid is the traditional way to answer to the
problem but it is only the result of strategic planning of the grid, thus applicable as
a long-term solution.
With development in technology, DSO can widen the view to handle the chal-
lenge with new solutions: by using the SG components in order to use the grid
more intelligently. For instance, DSO can invest to energy storages which have the
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capability to shave the peak and move it to a more reasonable time. Depending on
business models, removing the bottlenecks with energy storages or through DR can
be acquired from an actor from deregulated markets.
Solving the situation with a help of DER causes more potential conflicts. This
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.4.1.
This conflict is only valid when there is a significant amount of DER integrated
and the grid experiences congestions. In Nordics, the issue is not urgent: the grid has
built to cope with vast differences in terms of capacity. This comes from history:
the power levels fluctuate vastly because of the electrical heating that is used in
winter-time.
6.1.2 Cyber attacks expose the system to vulnerabilities
Smart Grid environment requires ICT systems, applications, Internet and different
data exchange services. Adding ICT exposes the systems to cyber attacks.
Discussion As the crucial parts of the energy system is controllable through com-
munication networks, vulnerabilities can be manipulated to even dangerous propor-
tions. For instance it can be possible to shut down power from large areas, causing
severe damage to every stakeholder.
Experts [58] commented that cyber security hasn’t been taken enough into con-
sideration in Smart Grid pilots. Reason for this is that until recently, cyber security
hasn’t been a major part of the design phase. Primary concepts of the Smart Grid,
e.g. business models and functionalities need to be addressed and goals clarified
prior more detailed concentration towards cyber security.
Moreover, the attack area expands via HEMS and DR-systems to customer’s
premises when these are implemented as a part of a Smart Grid. Usually these
solutions are internet-based. Actions of the devices on customers’ premises are in
the hands of a customer and customer’s behaviour in the internet. Without safety
control possibility, this is regarded as highly risky part of the chain. [58]
Proposed Solutions More weight to the cyber security already in design phase
helps it to become more concrete part of the system. By doing this already at early
stage will save time and effort, and results in maximising security. The complexity
of the system increases all of the time and all aspects regarding safety is hard to
take into account afterwards. [58]
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) has constituted
a group to identify and research the issue of cyber security concerning the Smart
Grid. For more details, report can be found [58].
6.1.3 Guaranteeing privacy of consumers
AMM gathers detailed data from customers’ behaviour. Ownership over the data,
who can access it, and benefit from it is not clear for the customer. Having control
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over data sets a lot of responsibilities for the DSO. Customers’ privacy has to be
ensured in every step it encounters in a value chain.
Discussion In Finland, the DSOs are obligated to measure and distribute Auto-
matic Meter Reading (AMR) data to retailer for billing and to BRP for imbalance
settlement purposes. From 2014, DSO is also required to deliver data to customer at
the same time as it is delivered to BRP and retailer. The DSO alone is responsible
for the accuracy of the data.
The ownership of the data is not defined explicitly. Thus, it is compared to
personal data, meaning that DSOs are not allowed to submit the data to any other
purpose than for billing and imbalance settlement without customers’ permission.
[95]
With AMM, the customer’s electricity usage is monitored more in detail. This
can be seen as a problem since it gives a rather detailed picture on persons’ or
families’ living habits. As the world evolves to more digital, customers start to get
interested on what is done with the data that is collected from them. In research
[11] it has been noted that many customers are scared about the loss of privacy.
In future energy domain, companies that create services to customers are getting
more interconnected and dependent. Call for ensuring the data privacy throughout
the whole value chain exists. Through standardized architecture of the Smart Grid
communication interface can lead to successful result. [58]
Proposed Solution Customer acceptance is seen as a key success factor for en-
abling the Smart Grid. Therefore, privacy can be seen as even a more important
aspect than a network security. Transparent and clear communication towards cus-
tomer is needed to avoid this conflict. The restrictions and anonymity level of the
data gathered has to be explained to the customer very thoroughly. For customers
searching information regarding this issue has to be made easy.
6.1.4 DSO’s tariff does not reflect real costs
Today’s network tariff is an energy-based tariff structure including a fixed fee. This
does not have enough cost correlation from DSOs point of view. Also customers
suffer due to the fact that everyone does not pay according to the expenses they
generate: an old tariff makes discrimination possible.
Discussion Tariffs are the only source of revenue for DSOs. The situation is pe-
culiar now since over 50% of DSO’s cost structure is comprised of building sufficient
capacity, but the tariffs have fixed cost and the variable cost on depending energy
usage, not power usage. [19]
Problem is that energy doesn’t reflect the actual costs DSOs are facing. In future
the gap between price structure and investments grows even further. This is due
to the changes on how the grid is used. More microgeneration implies that the
grid is used more in a ”battery-like”-way, i.e. taking electricity from there when
own consumption is not enough and feeding electricity to the grid if there’s excess
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amount of it. This results that less energy is moved. If the tariff is energy-based,
DSOs lose their revenue stream which is needed to cover the costs of maintaining
the grid.
Another problem regarding issue is that customers experience discrimination.
An illustrative example of discrimination is presented in Figures 21 and 22, where
consumption of two customers are examined. Distribution tariff for both are the
same, based on 3 * 25 A main fuse. As the costs for DSOs are dependent on peak
power, Customer 2 causes higher costs for DSO since its peak power is a lot higher
compared to Customer 1. Nevertheless, as the tariff is based on energy consumption
and not the power component, due to higher energy consumption Customer 1 pays
more. [19]
Figure 21: Customer 1: Yearly energy consumption: 24,9 MWh, peak power 12,4
kW. [19]
Proposed Solutions Different distribution tariffs are researched and studied to
tackle this issue. ”Power bandwidth tariff” is one potential tariff which has been
proposed to solve the unfair situation. It is thought to be relatively simple for
customers to comprehend since analogy can be drawn from the telecommunications
business. Customers have an idea of this concept through their broadband internet
contracts: the price depends on how much customer needs bandwidth. Essentially
it is the same as the fuse size customers have now, but with more dense intervals in
power scale. [79]
For DSOs, the bandwidth tariff would bring cost correlation: customers pay the
correct price for their behaviour.
Even though bandwidth tariff would delete discriminations between customers,
it has not been implemented yet. Customer’s understanding may not be in such a
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Figure 22: Customer 2: Yearly consumption 16,1 MWh, peak power 16,7 kW. [19]
good level as assumed. It is proposed that a new model is too radical compared to
the old tariff which causes confusion among customers. Implementation should be
done gradually so customers have time to adjust to the changes. [95]
Unease concerning the energy-efficiency is another potential threat. Now when
both tariffs, transmission as well as electricity consumption are both energy-based,
customer can realize on how one can save energy and therefore get financial benefit.
Bandwidth tariff is seen as a potentially threat to energy-efficiency schemes. [85]
This reasoning does not take into account that with bandwidth tariff customer
can make an impact to the size of ones distribution fee. As transmission fee is close
to half to the total sum, this can bring financial incentives for customer to start
being more energy-efficient.
More detailed studies about network tariffs can be found [2], [19].
6.1.5 DSO carries the risk for insolvent customer
In Norway, the DSO has the responsibility to sell electricity to a customer if one
cannot find a retailer from the open markets. A risk from potential customer’s
insolvency is carried by DSO. [52]
Discussion When designing the billing system the focus turns easily to question
of risk management. Today in Norway, DSOs have an interesting role since it acts as
a supplier of last resort, meaning that it is required to deliver electricity to customer
even if the customer is unable to get a contract with the retailer from markets.
This can lead to a troublesome situation. If the customer is unable to meet its
liabilities the DSO is financially responsible from the situation. The risk of this
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kind of insolvent customer is carried completely by DSO, whereas customer has no
consequences for actions regarding the matter.
In a bigger picture when designing the future is to look at the mechanism of how
the monetary transactions are done accordingly, where the right stakeholders carry
the right risks.
If an actor is insolvent the sanctions should be dropped on the actor which causes
the situation. Now it has been landed to the DSO without any compensation.
Proposed Solutions One way to solve this could be by paying the collaterals.
This solution has drawbacks as well. With collaterals the market entry for the new,
innovative start-up companies is made rather difficult. This isn’t either the way
on how we want the progression of the energy business to be heading. Still, more
investigation on finding the healthy and sound solution to this incomplete situation
is needed.
Another proposition is to transfer the distribution invoices to retailer, who then
does the invoicing from customer. [85]
6.2 Customer – Retailer
Following issues regarding the relationship with customer and retailer were identified
as a possible issues that needs solving or clarifying of the roles.
6.2.1 Vendor lock-in can reduce competition in markets
With increasing versatility of services provided, many of new services have a na-
ture to be longer-term investments (e.g. solar panels, home automation). Lock-in
through service contracts restricts customer’s options in open markets, thus reducing
competition.
Discussion Retailer can offer a variety of different services in the future. More
detailed data from AMM expands the possibilities in product portfolio multi-fold,
ranging from home automation to installing solar panels, possibilities are infinite.
Basic energy contracts have smaller portion in the portfolio.
New technology solutions and devices are expensive with years of payback times.
Contracts are adjusted accordingly, with longer commitments to the projects. Of-
fering has to be done in this way for the products to be attractive.
It depends on how this is done. There can be a challenge considering the payback
times of these new products, that the contract prolongs from what the customer have
used to. This lock-in with the certain retailer can be seen as a challenge compared
to the situation nowadays. For instance, these long-term contracts have changed
telecommunications company and cell phone business’ nature. With more strict
and long-term contracts, the innovative start-ups have an extra barrier in order to
penetrate to the market. Customers can suffer from this, as competition diminishes
and large players have more strong dominance over the market.
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On the other hand, longer contracts, when done properly, help customer to save
money and learn about their energy efficiency. It is heuristic, long process that
suffers if many parties participate in it. The learning curve of the customer is easier
to evaluate when there is a longer relationship. Long-term contracts may also help
start-ups as well. If a start up manages to get long-term contracts, it will result to
more steady revenue flow, thus helping to build longer-term strategy to company.
[91]
This feature emphasizes in the future when the characteristics of customers are
better known and therefore the custom-made solutions become more popular and
widely used. From today’s world the analogy could be subcontractors where using
the same contractor brings benefits since these are longer projects where value is
realized in long-term.
Proposed Solutions Consumer protection policies supervises customer’s inter-
ests. This secures that the contracts and terms stay in reasonable levels. The
contracts have to be made clear to both participants to avoid problems with inter-
ests. When agreeing to the fixed time period contract, a customer takes a conscious
risk and gets benefits in return.
6.2.2 Dynamic tariff transfer the risk to the customer
Dynamic tariffs, like Spot-priced tariffs will become more popular in the future. [91],
[88], [74] A Spot-priced tariff will transfer the risk of the market volatility to the
customer. Customer does not have enough resources to take the advantage from
Spot-tariff, and unpleasant surprises in electricity invoices might emerge.
Discussion As many of the conflicts with customer on the other side, this case
originates from the fact that customer does not have competence to follow the
electricity consumption too closely. Customers lack time and desire to follow prices
very accurately. This fact implies that there is little a customer can do to prepare
for the sudden and large changes in Spot prices.
It is not easy to explain the vast variation of electricity prices to the customers.
It takes a part of the risk of forecasting from retailer and brings it to customer. This
can be a conflict, but also a possibility for the customer since now one really can
impact the cost using the real market signal. [91]
On the other hand, this service can be used to enable more services behind it.
Then retailer can provide additional service to do the demand response on behalf of
the customer. Overall benefit margin to customer from this might become thin.
Proposed Solutions What is crucial on the subject is on how the dynamic tariffs
are designed. The trade-off risk from constant priced tariff with premium against
Spot-priced tariff has to deliver more value to the customer. Otherwise transition
does not happen. Communication and clear information about benefits and the risks
has to be explained to the customer in order to avoid unpleasant conflict situations.
People like safety, so the question is how much extra value the alternative dynamic
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tariff can deliver. Other incentives, such as environmental values, have to be taken
into account as well. Retailers have to do very extensive market research to find a
right marketing strategy.
Of course, customers can always choose the flat-rate tariffs in future as well, but
the benefits from changing the energy usage are smaller.
6.2.3 Retailer carries the risk of insolvent customer
In Finland and Sweden the local retailers, i.e. the retailer who has the biggest
market share in the distribution network area in question, has the obligation to
function as a supplier of the last resort. [52]
A risk from potential customer’s insolvency is carried by the local retailer. Same
discussion and solution is applicable as in the case of DSO carrying the risk in 6.1.5.
6.3 Customer – Aggregator
In this section potential conflicts between customer and an aggregator are discussed.
6.3.1 Trade-off between convenience and benefits from DR may not be
sufficient
There is a trade-off between convenience and the benefits from shifting the loads to
another time. Shifting loads have alternative costs, and the benefit from this should
be enough to be worth doing.
Discussion In Nordics the small-scale aggregation has some prerequisites to make
business cases more viable. This comes from the fact that there are a lot of electrical
heating installed in houses. Estimations of it has been measured to be close to 1200
MW: exploiting even a fraction can make a significant business. [24]
So far small-scale aggregation hasn’t existed. In the past technical barriers have
been on the way of exploiting this in large scale as the payback times of HEMS
systems have been too long. This is connected also to the price level of the electricity,
which has been low historically. Controlling loads have not been beneficial enough.
Now the transition phase is on its way: technology has advanced and economies of
scale has dropped the prices of devices to a reasonable level. Energy consumption
measurements have turned to more accurate and in real-time. Also developments
in markets support demand response: dynamic tariffs are offered which enable the
benefits from load shifting to customers.
With certain conditions, a small-scale aggregation is rational thing to do. For
heating, it is easy to arrange without any harm done to the customer’s comfort level.
Situation changes drastically if aggregation is expanded to so called ”white goods”,
i.e. appliances with large power in household level, stoves, washing machines, re-
frigerators.
General view is that going so deep to customer’s everyday life is not possible.
[78], [73], [81] The comfort level suffers too much compared to the savings achieved
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with behaviour manipulation. ”In Germany political pressure is on this kind of
things at the moment. We see this kind of action waste of taxpayers time and
money. It will never happen.” [78]
For larger customers it is easier to see the impact since the loads are much bigger
and also convenience factors are not so relevant. Trade-off is done between saved
money and causing fluctuations to process, either delaying or boosting certain part
of the process.
Compared to a small-scale aggregation, discussing bigger-scale aggregation has
better situation business-wise, but a similar problem lies here as well. Through
doing field work to acquire the control over processes, two comments come usually
from customers:
1. People see that it is not worth to control the devices, since the saving is so
small. A counter argument for this is that it would be beneficial to still take
that sum, since implementing the devices is not very costly.
2. It is hard to show quantitatively how much benefit one could get exactly, since
the market prices vary year by year. Therefore selling of this kind of product
can be tricky. [92]
Benefits from the DR should go to the customer. When reducing the load at
certain time, it means that something is not done, a part of the process experiences
delay for instance. This action has an alternative cost. In order to get this flexibility
to the markets, the benefit has to go to the player who is willing to change its
behaviour, a customer. [92]
The division of revenue between an aggregator and a customer might diminish the
benefit to so small that it might be hard to convince customers to start collaborating
with an aggregator.
Proposed Solutions Business cases for aggregation are viable, both in large scale
and small-scale. Active role in promoting the idea for customer is solution for
aggregation to take on hold. It is still seen as a new thing and the practices regarding
the implementation have not been established yet. When aggregation becomes more
popular it has potential to grow at a fast pace. [90] Also all the benefits from
DR are not easy to see before doing pilots. ”In one of our pilots, the optimised
load controlling resulted in more pleasant working environment. Compressor was
controlled according to cheapest price hours, which are usually off-working hours.
Now the noise disappeared during daytime. Employees were much more satisfied to
the situation. One cannot find these benefits by doing only monetary calculations,
but going out there and implementing the plan.” [92]
As customer gets enough understanding on what is behind the business logic as
well as can negotiate a fair contract, the possibility of this conflict reduces.
6.3.2 Suspicion against giving away controlling possibility
Customers can get anxious about giving the control away from them. When bringing
a new concept to the service business, the most important issue is to put together
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an aggregators’ communication strategy.
Discussion It is hard to establish trust between a customer and an aggregator.
People are suspicious to give the control away from their own hands, and the trust
has to be earned. Also all the new ideas need assuring people how it really works,
showing benefits clearly and how they are formed. The main point is that service
should be effortless for them and the service delivers exactly what it promises. The
service has to be very reliable from the very beginning. It was found that frustration
can become too high if the service has reliability issues. It is crucial even in beta-
phase to make sure the service does not experience too much uncertainties. [11]
Proposed Solutions For solution to ease the suspicion is two-fold: educating
the customer and designing a well-functioning, simple to use product. The service
offered has to be well-structured and designed to be as reliable as possible because
in future, customers need simple, functional overall solutions. They do not have
time for solving the details. This service has to be offered to them as a package. [91]
This means that the service portfolio has to be made comprehensible for a person
who is not familiar with the energy markets. One option is the overriding possibility
to DR actions. It would ease the barrier for adapting the new systems.
6.3.3 Compensation for sold electricity is not sufficient in customer’s
perspective
The trend for microgeneration popularity is rising. Amount of microgeneration can
exceed consumption at certain times. In this situation, the excess capacity is sold to
the markets. If the renewable energy is not subsidised, the prosumer gets the market
price for its produced electricity. Customer might expect the price of electricity to
be close to what he is used to pay to the retailer, which is not true after taxes and
transmission fees.
Discussion As the aggregation starts to develop VPPs, it might be that conflict
emerges when prosumers see the fee of at what price is the aggregator willing to pay
for the electricity. In a situation when there is good conditions for renewable energy
production, it means that other microgenerators experience similar conditions as
well. This generated overcapacity affects the system price by bringing it down.
Without feed-in-tariffs, a single producer experiences this collapsed price. Selling
excess production to the markets seems unattractive. [87]
The situation depends on what are the expectations of a customer for the pro-
duced electricity. Fixed tariff prices are the ones that customer has accustomed to.
Customer might expect to get the same price for the electricity he produces himself,
which is not likely to happen. The tariff prices include the risk of the price volatility
that a retailer carries, taxes and transmission fees which means that customer might
not be pleased to the actual price.
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Proposed Solutions More clear understanding on how the price of electricity is
formed would solve the problem. Teaching customers helps this process. Teaching
is the best solution, but it is a challenge to actually conduct it. Best solution would
be the clear communication on the realistic expectations of what will be the possible
compensation sum before making the contract.
6.3.4 Generation resources’ ownership
The ownership of the generation can have a variety of forms. Contracts and the
allocation of the risks and benefits can cause friction between players.
Discussion When starting to plan on purchasing the micro-generation device, it is
a question on how it is beneficial to arrange its costs. Ownership can be completely
customers’, it can be leased from retailer or ownership can be co-owned with another
party. Prosumer starts to ponder the questions considering of the device’s ownership
and usage: who will get the benefit of the device.
Proposed Solutions Depending on the nature of customer and the size of the
micro-generation plant, different solutions exist. This requires new approaches to
the matter. New business models have developed for this issue. For instance in
Denmark and Germany, public resistance against building wind turbines have re-
duced significantly when the ownership structure is such that it takes into account
the local people, e.g. community-owned power plants or co-ownership of the utility
with energy companies. [44]
New ownership models have worked for larger-scale wind turbine projects. The
strategy might be possible to pass on to concern micro-generation as well, thus
lowering the threshold for small customers to acquire a production unit.
6.4 DSO – Retailer
6.4.1 Different signals for load controlling
If DR is available through customer’s load controlling, the control signal from
market-side can be conflicting from the system-side.
Discussion Through AMR or HEMS it is possible for both actors to control cus-
tomer’s loads, but there can be the essential differences of the interests between
DSO and retailer. DSO is responsible for keeping the system in balance within al-
lowed limits, whereas the retailer wants to maximize the profit between sold energy
and acquired energy from the wholesale markets. This can lead to problems since
the lowest Spot-market prices does not always coincide with local network’s power
levels, creating unnatural power peaks and other unwanted features from the DSO
perspective. [46]
62
Proposed Solutions By creating the market mechanism which would take into
account the signals both from market-side as well as from system-side, the signal
which needs the load reduction more will go through. In Section 5.4.1 the challenges
with the market mechanism itself is discussed.
Also the signals might not be radically different always so the potential threat of
this conflict can stay in small scale. In Chapter 7, the scale of this conflict, i.e. how
much discrepancy in signals there has been historically in Finland, is examined.
6.4.2 DSO carries the risk from insolvent retailer
Risk allocation is unequal between DSO and retailer, from the same reasons as in
DSO and customer, see section 6.1.5.
6.4.3 DSO may lose the customer interface to retailer
Supplier-Centric Model has been discussed in politics considering the future devel-
opments of the markets. In Supplier-Centric Model, the customer interface would
be transferred completely to the retailer: customer service and invoicing would be
done only with retailer. A suggestion has stirred a debate among DSOs. For some
DSOs, losing the customer interface is seen as a threat: a customer cannot get local,
expert knowledge to problems regarding the grid. [64]
Discussion Regulation is leaning strongly towards Supplier-Centric Model. SCM
is thought to be most customer-centric approach available: Customer has to contact
only one party, has only one legal contract and receives only one invoice. [49]
Criticism regarding the model argues that benefits from the system are not enough
compared to investments made: SCM requires very large-scale, reliable data systems
with vast amounts of data transferring by DSO. In Figure 23 basic structures of the
two competitive market models are demonstrated.
DSO would not have connection to the customer but has a crucial part in enabling
the data from the AMR to the different parties involved.
Proposed Solutions For the solution it has been proposed to build a common
data hub for all the stakeholders to use. Standardization of systems would divide the
expenses of the project to the larger group, and through collaboration with larger
DSOs, also smaller DSOs would benefit from this. Building a common large-scale
data system requires strong guidance from regulation. This is due to the variety
of opinions on how it should be solved. In order for this kind of data hub to work
it requires that it is mandatory for all involved stakeholders to use the hub. This
requires regulatory measures. [91]
SCM opens possibilities for DSOs horizontally. For instance, it would be possible
to offer the customers only one phone number in case of black-outs in the larger areas,
covering the whole of Finland for instance.
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Figure 23: Present Market Model and Supplier Centric Model. Adjusted from [59].
6.4.4 DSO has possibility for market power in bottleneck situations
Synchronous load controls might cause bottlenecks to the grid. In order to avoid
overload, the rules concerning priority of which loads are turned on or off has to be
dealt with.
Discussion This conflict is relevant if the load control signals go through DSO
for verification before taking action. DSOs role in verification is to ensure that the
control does not cause danger to the grid stability. With this assumption, a scenario
can be that certain area experiences power overflow if all the desired load control
signals would be executed. Situation puts DSO to the difficult position, whether
to decline some of the signals or no control is made during that time period. This
distorts markets and is not optimal solution.
Possible Solutions Rules regarding prioritisation has to be formed in order to
make the roles more clear. Bottlenecks should not produce discrimination, nor even
a possibility to use market power for someone’s own benefit. The regulation is
needed proactively.
6.4.5 More efficient data exchange causes costs for DSO
Data collecting and distributing it forward is DSOs task. Data processing will face
more strict time limits in the future. This increases incurred costs for the DSO,
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whereas retailer benefits from this trend.
Discussion The pressure for the pace of data exchange is increasing, and even
more so in the future. It is thought that it will be as frequent as in every 15
minutes. Data verification and distributing it forward puts a strain to the DSO. It
has to be done as cost-efficiently as possible. [85]
For retailer, it has positive effects. Data is available more instantly and can be
used to its own processes in billing and distributing it to BRP.
Proposed Solutions If the pressure for faster data exchange comes from regu-
lation, the compensation has to be enough to avoid unreasonably high costs which
DSO faces. Cost investments for implementing efficient data exchange system can
be hard to prefigure.
6.4.6 Ownership of the electricity storages are not clearly defined
Electricity storages can be used in benefit of DSO as well as retailer. In order to
avoid conflicts, the rules for the new concepts has to be defined clearly.
Discussion Electricity storages and its ability to absorb energy at low price and
feed energy during peak prices makes its characteristics similar to DR. In EUR-
ELECTRIC report two functional areas for electricity storages are identified:
• Energy Management – Decoupling the generation of electricity from its instan-
taneous consumption. (Arbitrage of energy)
• System Services – Services that are used to enhance the quality of service and
security of supply in electricity power system. [57]
Areas confront each other. To use electricity to enhance quality of service means
that storage does not participate in markets, which is distorting the competition.
On the other hand, using the storage to gain revenue through price fluctuations can
cause problems to the grid through unnatural power flows.
Proposed Solutions Adapting a new class of asset to the infrastructure always
demands its role definition. Storage’s capabilities to act as an generator or a con-
sumer needs a set of rules. Comprehensive cost-benefit analysis for energy storages
is needed to meet the interests of all market players. [57]
6.5 DSO – Aggregator
6.5.1 DSO might be reluctant to share the data
There is no law that 3rd party may access the data received from Smart Meters.
The DSO might be reluctant to give this data away, or is able to postpone the data
transfer.
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Discussion Data sharing is not DSOs core business, but it is required to collect
the data. If it has to distribute the data to more parties than obligated by law, DSO
might be reluctant to do this because it requires extra work.
So far, DSO has no obligations to share the AMM data to aggregator. This
might hinder the entrance of the new actors to the field as agreements about data
ownership are still open to discussion.
Proposed Solutions Either access to DSOs data has to be made more simple or
an aggregator has to find another way around this obstacle, e.g. by measuring the
data itself.
6.5.2 Ability of an aggregator to use market power against DSO
An aggregator can manipulate the price of the DR to unnaturally high level, if it
offers DR services to DSO in order to avoid the overloading situation.
Discussion This conflict has same characteristics similar to 6.4.4, where DSO
might have possibility for using discrimination. Now the scenario is as follows: if
there is no need from DSO to confirm the load control signal, an aggregator can
raise the price of the DR to unreasonably high values. DSO has the pressure for
purchasing in order to fulfil its duties regarding grid stability.
Synchronous control signals cause large changes in power flows, which is against
DSOs wish. If the signal for the load control comes only from market-side, it results
in ramped power flows.
Proposed Solutions If the system level signal is made possible for the DSO
to perform, it would result in controlling the loads more evenly. Trade-off is that
deregulated markets do not get full benefit from DR. Other solution is to make price
ceiling for the flexibility services that are offered to the DSO. Thirdly, same solution
as in 6.4.4 can be used. DSO can have right to limit the controls if there is danger
situation.
6.5.3 Different signals for load controlling
The aggregation does not have differences concerning this conflict on this subject
whether the aggregator is 3rd party or retailer. The main problem is that if the
control signals come only from market-side, it might have coinciding effects on DSOs
interests. This conflict is introduced in more detail in Chapter 7.
6.5.4 Aggregator may cause instabilities to the grid
DR can be implemented through several channels. One logical channel is HEMS.
Another channel for controlling loads is a Smart Meter, which is owned by DSO.
Doing the control through Smart Meter, DSO is part of the chain that is needed
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in order to execute switching of the load. If requests go through DSO, it has un-
derstanding on the state of the grid at given time. If controls are made only by an
aggregator without any verifications needed, DSOs lose the control and knowledge
about what is happening in their own grid.
Discussion The reasoning on why DSOs are active in engaging load control through
Smart Meter is that it fulfils its task on ensuring the functionality of electricity mar-
kets. As DR will be an important part of the future’s electricity markets, promoting
and helping to capture the benefits of DR is seen as a task for DSO to be part of.
DSO ensures the markets’ proper functioning by keeping the distribution grid
in balance, avoiding bottlenecks and overloading of the grid components. From this
point of view, it is easy to see DSO’s interest towards DR. The synchronous control
of loads ha an impact on grid’s power flows. It is beneficial to sustain knowledge of
the grid’s state. Signals coming to DSO-level about planned controlling schemes help
DSO to be prepared to potential intensive situations pro-actively. The knowledge
about the state of the grid remains in DSOs hands.
HEMS systems might cause problems to the grid stability. Synchronous control
signals to loads always cause peaking of the power to the grid. It is a question that
who should carry the responsibility of this action, if it causes emergency situations
to the grid. If the controls are out of the DSOs hands completely, nothing can be
done to react in danger situation. [76]
Proposed Solutions Collaboration with actors are strongly recommended. DR
has to be in very popular before the load shifting has bigger impacts so it is not the
burning issue. Nevertheless, it is beneficial for every stakeholder to make clear rules
early enough.
6.5.5 Regulatory Bottlenecks for DR services
Regulatory framework can restrict the interest of DSOs to acquire DR services.
Discussion Depending on country, the regulation model for the DSO varies. Reg-
ulation in Smart Grid should be designed to take into account the new possibilities
on deferring the grid investments, e.g. DR and electricity storages.
Today, regulation does not support DR very efficiently. If DSO consumes peak
shaving services, it reduces the need of physical assets. If regulation emphasizes
stronger incentives for reducing operational costs with less focus on capital expen-
ditures, DSO is uninterested on using DR services as an alternative solution for
constraints. [7]
Connected to regulation and the nature of the role DSO has, it is hard to establish
viable business model for offering DR services to DSOs. According to Schulz: ”In
theory, there can be a business model that you will sell DR services to DSOs. In
Germany DSOs are struggling because there is a law that you have to buy the energy
from small producers to the grid. In theory they are a good customer but in practice
it will be a slower market to develop. This is partly because of the way DSO gets
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reimbursed. If they buy a new transformer they know exactly what to do, they
buy this asset and they get their money back over time. If they buy software or
IT service, the calculation for payback is not that easy since the approach is new.
Regulation again: if there would be clear way how they would get paid for it, they
would be good customers.” [78]
Proposed Solutions As mentioned, a healthy attitude towards regulation and
laws steer the development to the right direction. Regulation should encourage
new, innovative business approaches.
6.6 DSO – TSO
6.6.1 Data Communication Interface is needed
Emergence of DER demands interaction between DSO and TSO in order to keep
the balance in the grid. Building interface is costly and views on how it is executed
in practice vary among players.
Discussion Through DER, generation emerges in parts of the grid where it didn’t
exist before. In addition, this generation has different nature as it has more complex
production patterns compared to the traditional power plants. A clear interface for
DSO and TSO is needed and the operations models regarding it has to be created.
At present there is none, because need for interaction hasn’t existed. Before large
power plants have stayed put. [77] Since there are several DSOs and several views
on the outlook of the future, agreeing on interface common ground rules have proven
to be difficult to solve.
Proposed Solutions It is crucial to get dialogue going between DSOs and TSO.
Luckily, the actors have identified the importance of the subject. Rules about the
responsibilities of reporting among actors has to be solved. [86]
6.7 Aggregator – Retailer
6.7.1 Losing market share to a new player
The most obvious challenge between these two players is that their customer segment
can overlap. As mentioned earlier, if an aggregator decides to operate in markets,
its role is exactly the same as the retailer. [50]
Discussion An aggregator can have different roles. From retailer’s point of view,
an aggregator can be an actor who helps customer to optimize the energy usage
by reshaping the energy consumption curve. In this case, collaboration is needed
in order to know what kind of changes there will be, considering the balancing
settlement. In this model an aggregator is basically an ICT service company to a
retailer.
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Another role of an aggregator includes the participation in power exchange. The
need for collaboration disappears and an aggregator becomes retailer-aggregator.
Both actors can have same customer base, which means that competition gets better
in electricity markets.
Proposed Solutions Conflict creates natural development of markets closer to
perfect competition. Penetration of aggregators to the energy business should be
supported in order to enhance better market functioning.
6.7.2 Cost of forecasting errors
3rd party aggregator, which shifts energy consumption to different times than re-
tailer forecasts can create a conflict situation.
Discussion Retailer’s interest is to stay on the balance it has projected for energy
consumption. A retailer has acquired the assumed amount of electricity it will need
the following day from Elspot market. The margin between retailer’s procurements
and sales of energy has to be settled through imbalance power. Through an indi-
vidual aggregator with no connection to retailer, aggregator’s actions will increase
the errors in next day’s forecasting. The volatility of imbalance power prices cause
extra risks and costs for the retailer. [36]
Proposed Solutions Collaboration with a retailer would be expected from ag-
gregator, if an aggregator is not responsible for maintaining its balance.
6.8 Aggregator – Generator
6.8.1 Demand Flexibility brings down the market price
Demand Flexibility that an aggregator introduces presses down the market price
and reduces the amount of peak prices. For generators that have a lot of flexible
production, less peak prices is not desirable. It causes the diminishing of revenue.
Discussion Peak prices come up when peak power capacity is ignited in order
to meet the high demand. Peak generation units have high variable costs because
it usually uses expensive fuel such as gas, causing the price to go up. In the past
demand has had little flexibility, so production has followed demand. If demand has
flexibility, some of the energy consumption can be shifted to another time and the
peak does not occur. Investing to peak power plants becomes less profitable if they
are needed less. Also ones that are already built will experience the loss of revenue
because peak generation units are not used as much as before.
From simple demand-supply curve in Figure 24, it is easy to show on how the DR
affects the Spot-price. Investments to peak load power plants become less attractive.
If there is a possibility to change demand from certain, expensive moment to another
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Figure 24: Demand flexibility causes the price to drop.
time, the demand curve moves to the left when the price is high. This causes the
price to drop down.
Proposed Solutions Issue is the relevance of this scenario: it will be a long time
before demand flexibility reaches such a large scale that it has effects on the market
price. On the other hand, the power plants are long-term investments, ranging from
10-20 years. DR adds another parameter for forecasting the payback time of these
projects in rapidly changing market environment.
6.9 Aggregator – TSO
6.9.1 Regulatory framework for reserves are strict
TSO’s requirements for different reserves can be very specific regarding the volume
and the activation time. This can create a barrier for an aggregator to fulfil the
requirements.
Discussion The current regulatory frame might impose too strict requirements
on the volume or the availability of reserve power. Current product portfolio has
planned to fit for the traditional, large consumers or producers. First solutions
for aggregation services are emerging and supporting this kind of trend would be
70
beneficial for the markets, and for TSO. TSO is in key position to help this kind
of new solutions to take on hold. From TSO’s perspective, an aggregator has a
very useful asset but igniting the new business is difficult At the moment it can be
problematic for a small player like an aggregator to enter the market: critical mass
needed is too large.
Proposed Solutions If there is a will to engage demand flexibility from small
scale customers as well, changes in reserve requirements can be made to enable
it. TSOs could re-think their product portfolio and create products that can help
aggregators to enter the market. For TSO, it is beneficial to boost DR services
further. DR has very positive effects on TSO’s business, it helps to decrease costs
that come from buliding reserve power and new cables. Reserve costs are expected
to become multifold in the near-future, so there is definitely a need for a demand
flexibility. [86]
6.9.2 Balancing destabilisation can cause volatility to TSO’s balance
sheet
If aggregator’s actions create volatility in BRP’s balance sheet, it can reflect to TSO
as well.
Discussion TSO is responsible to keep the balance in its system area. This li-
ability is delegated to BRP’s who are responsible for the balance in the area they
operate. Volatility in balance sheets from aggregator actions can reflect to BRP. If
variation is large it can mix TSO’s balance as well.
Proposed Solutions This conflict will need immense amount of aggregated loads
in order to happen. Before reaching this state, the whole environment has changed
as well. Communication through the different parties will help to communicate the
signals forward. If there is efficient information exchange with aggregator, BRPs and
the TSO, everyone could react to the situations caused by another party’s actions.
6.10 Aggregator – BRP
6.10.1 Restricting an aggregator’s entry to market
Concerns about competition in the market for aggregating demand response are
raised. If there is requirement for an aggregator to be in agreement with BRP
about controlling the loads under BRP area, it can lead to a situation where BRP
can resist this action. It is against competition standards.
Discussion BRP can have interests to obtain the boundary for an aggregator for
restricting its market participation. This conflict depends on countries’ regulations,
but an example comes from France where the competition authority identified 3
reasons for BRPs to be against aggregator actions:
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1. BRP might want to eliminate a potential competitor in the balancing mecha-
nism, since a lot of BRP are electricity generators.
2. BRP is under developing its own demand response services. The French com-
petition authority noted that several suppliers had their own service develop-
ment programmes.
3. BRP might want to resist an aggregator entry if an aggregator action reduces
its own customers’ consumption. Consumption reduction reflects to BRP’s
revenue stream negatively. [20]
Proposed Solutions Regulators have to take proactive role to ensure a stable
competition situation to avoid the conflicts and make clear rules on how the aggre-
gation should be viewed in the markets.
6.11 Generator – Customer
6.11.1 Controllability of base-load power plants and DER is limited
Base-load power plants, such as nuclear power plants are designed to produce steady
generation output. If renewable power generators do not have incentive to restrict
the production at times when there’s excess amount of generation, the base-load
power generator has to adjust the production, with power plants that are not de-
signed for it.
Discussion The conflict occurs when the amount of DER has an impact on the
overall markets. On a sunny and windy day the production rate from RES may rise
to such levels that there is a threat of excess production. If the RES generators don’t
have incentive to restrict the production, base-load power plants have to restrict the
production instead. The fact which makes the situation even more dangerous is
that the RES generation might escalate quickly, in a matter of hours. The base-load
power plants may not be able to respond fast enough.
Proposed Solutions If RES does not have feed-in tariffs, by introducing negative
prices to the markets have the effect of restraining the excess production situations
by making it unprofitable to produce more energy. Renewable production can be
made flexible as well by introducing more intelligent controls where PV and wind
mills can be dropped off from the grid in a controllable way if there is a surplus of
production at some point of time. Also DR balances out some of the threats that
are introduced by uncontrollable production.
6.11.2 Micro-generation diminishes the overall volume in markets
If customers start to evolve into prosumers, i.e. have own production, generators
experience diminishing overall volume in market.
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Discussion With promotion of micro-generation, energy generation will increase
in customers own premises. The overall volume that is acquired from the wholesale
markets diminishes, implicating utility companies suffer revenue losses. Also with
energy efficiency schemes that are promoted, the overall energy need can decrease
which in turn also effects to the energy consumption negatively. Third factor which
affects to the energy consumption in the long run is the trend concerning energy-
intensive industry. Industry has started to move away from Nordic countries to
countries with cheaper cost-levels.
Proposed Solutions Governmental subsidies play a large role in the penetration
speed of the micro-generation. This factor causes uncertainty for large utility com-
panies, causing higher risk for the planning of new power plants. If the incentive
strategy would be long-term and without large changes in direction, the conflict dis-
appears. In this situation, utility companies take premeditated risk when initiating
new projects.
6.11.3 Distorting the market with renewable subsidies
Wrong kind of incentives for renewable energy can distort the market’s functioning
and end up in non-optimal situation.
Discussion Incentives can have unintended and undesirable results consequences
which do not lead to the action incentive-makers wanted in the first place. Therefore
policy-makers have to be very careful in designing them. For instance, strong tariffs
can create a wrong kind of incentive for the DER-owner to always produce energy
as much as possible, regardless if it is needed or not. The signals from both system-
level and market-level does not matter for the actor, since tariff guarantees a certain
sum per energy which is produced.
In a situation where there are lots of renewable energy production in the system,
the generators without guaranteed tariff see the collapsed price resulting from excess
production the system experiences.
Proposed Solutions Renewable energy should be put into the system through
market-based solutions. If the markets let the price to go to negative, it would
result better functioning markets: generators would have the incentive to restrict
the production when it is not needed. When every actor is exposed to the right
signals and price levels, market’s find the optimal equilibrium.
6.12 Collated Map of Potential Conflicts of Interests
Discussed potential conflicts and relationships between actors are illustrated in Fig-
ure 25. All the conflicts discussed above form a map where it is easier to see which
players have most conflicting roles and which players need to re-evaluate their po-
sition in markets. It has to be emphasized that the conflicts mentioned are only
potential. Somewhat expectedly, most of the conflicts are related to DSO, followed
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by the newcomers in the energy field: an aggregator and a prosumer. The role of
DSO as a regulated entity creates friction when the possibilities to turn into a more
active participant through Smart Grid emergence. The roles of new actors, an ag-
gregator and a prosumer, are still unclear. Without history, insecurity rises on how
are they placed in value network.
Figure 25: Map of Potential Conflicts of Interests.
74
7 Case study
7.1 Introduction
One of the main concerns in aggregator’s emergence is the question on its effects
on the grid. There can be a potential conflict of interest between the aggregator,
who controls the loads solely from the signals of the electricity markets, and a DSO,
who would want to keep the consumption curve as even as possible. It is suspected
that aggregator’s synchronous actions will raise the peak power, forcing the DSO to
make additional investments on strengthening the grid against new peaks. Another
negative impact can be the increased fluctuation in power flows. If fluctuation
amplitude is large, the quality of service becomes harder for DSOs to maintain.
The aim for this case study is to give a clarification on what will happen to the
grid if the aggregator will optimise the heating load by shifting the heating need to
the cheapest Spot-hours available. In literature there has been two different views
on how this will affect the grid:
1. This aggregator behaviour of controlling the loads will result more smooth
load curves. It is a win-win-situation for both of the retailer as well as for
the DSO. Retailer gets lower exposure to high prices and DSO will get lower
congestions, lower losses and lower grid investments. [14]
2. Aggregator might create higher power peaks to the grid, since high demand
isn’t necessarily aligned with price peaks. This means that there will be a
conflict of interest between these players. [2], [19]
This case study considers the relationship of these two actors in a scenario where
an aggregator would have all the potential customers in Fortum’s Finnish distribu-
tion network and control the loads according to the cheapest hours in the Spot-
markets. It is analysed how the electricity consumption profile would change as well
as monetary effects the Spot-priced control would result.
7.2 Background
In literature the situation has been discussed as a potential source of conflict which
should be solved pro-actively by creating rules and boundaries of who can do it,
what is the mechanism and the effects of aggregation action.
In Figure 26 the interfering Spot price and feeder load are illustrated.
It is shown that the peak power and hourly spot prices interfere at 22:00, mainly
because of the historical reasons on how the Nordic electricity markets have devel-
oped. Reasoning behind it is found when looking at overall system level. At 22:00
the demand isn’t that high anymore: most of the public, commercial and majority
of industry customers have stopped working at this point. But from historical tariff
structures, the heating loads are turned on approximately at this time, which causes
the interference locally in the grid. Also the consumption from private customers
still exist. Together these two factors cause unnaturally high peak power. [40]
75
Figure 26: Hourly spot prices and powers on the time scale. [40]
In Finland, the utilization of small-scale demand response has been vastly re-
searched. Characteristics of the country’s electricity use makes it interesting: be-
cause of cold winters the electrical heating is a prevalent form of heating. Easy step
to utilize it is to start by controlling the heating loads in houses. The electrical
heating is rather popular in detached and semi-detached houses which are not built
in district heating area.
The first step forward in this sector has been done recently. The Smart Meters
can be used to do this controlling. A pilot project by Helen Sa¨hko¨verkko Oy tested
this approach to control the heating according to Spot prices has shown promising
results. The technical aspects, the control signals for the meters have been reliable
and the pilot is considered to expand further to reach 2000 customers by the end of
the year 2012. [37]
Another way to do small-scale aggregation is through home automation. In
September 2012, Fortum introduced a new service called Fortum Fiksu. If a house
has a electric storage heating, it is possible to use Fortum Fiksu solution when
control system is installed to household. The control system determines the heating
need every day and chooses the cheapest hours for it automatically. It is done in
collaboration with There corporation who provides the ICT-systems to make the
automated control. [38] System also has connections to the future development.
If the household has solar panels as well, the system takes the own production in
account as well and optimizes the consumption accordingly. [38]
The case shows if there’s potential challenges connected to this. It also shows
the validity of services aggregator can sell to DSOs. One suggested service that
aggregation will bring is the maximum peak shaving service, which can help DSOs
to defer their grid investments further. The case will show whether this kind of
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service has enough demand to actually be economically feasible.
7.3 Assumptions
For the reasons mentioned in Chapter 7.2., the created scenario has a following
composition.
• The traditional heating method requires the same amount of heating as the
Spot-priced, but the heating starts at fixed time, 22:00 until the thermostat
switches the load off.
• An aggregator has a direct load control over electrical heating of the cus-
tomers. The customers have purchased a service where an aggregator controls
the electrical heating with certain boundaries concerning indoor temperature
limits.
• In the simulation the customer’s behaviour is the ”optimal customer” from
the retailers’ point of view, meaning that all the controls the retailer suggests
go through.
• An aggregator operates only in Spot markets. The signal for the load control
is fetched once a day from hourly Spot prices. An aggregator-retailer always
chooses the cheapest hours for the heating that are needed that day, hedging
does not affect on this process. This assumption is not so intuitive, but the
hedging of the electricity doesn’t have effect to this matter. Usually hedging
is constant to a certain time-frame, which means that if there’s a possibility to
move physical acquiring of the electricity to the cheaper hours, it will always
be profitable for the aggregator. [88]
• Customers are outside of the district heating and therefore the heating is done
electrically with a heat storage, e.g. a water tank.
In Fortum’s distribution area there are approximately 50 000 potential customers
that could participate in small-scale aggrgation. Information should be considered
with reservation since it is not known if these households have also some other sources
of heating such as fire-places or geothermal heat pumps that affect the heating need
radically.
7.3.1 Data needed
In order to map the behaviour of system with dynamic tariff control, historical Spot
prices from Nordics are needed. In this case study dataset consists of hourly Spot
area prices in Finland from January 2010 until July 2012. Prices are available in
Nord Pool Spot’s webpage [31].
Determining the number of hours for heating needed per day, the outdoor tem-
peratures are required. City of Turku kindly provided this dataset for the use of
this case. Data was given with hourly temperatures of the timespan January 2010
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until July 2012. From hourly values the daily average was obtained. The data was
collected from Oriketo.
The correlation with outside temperature and the heating need is needed to get
some approximation of the system’s behaviour. In this case the Formula for the
amount of hours per day is used:
f(T ) = 3 +
2× (13− T )
13
, T < 13◦C (1)
f(T ) = 3, T ≥ 13◦C (2)
This Formula comes from empirical research and has been used in Helen Sa¨hko¨verkko.
[75]
With these datasets, the heating amount per day and the cheapest hours per
day could be identified in daily basis in the timespan of two and a half years.
After identifying the cheapest hours, it was estimated that heating need stays
the same compared to old situation and the graph was scaled to have equivalence
with the situation experienced today.
7.3.2 Analysis restrictions
Certain assumptions had to be made, and in this section the restrictions regarding
the model are discussed.
Sadly there were no AMR data available from the suitable targets, so still the
analysis were done by using the estimation consumption curves. These are not
completely accurate for several reasons. First of all, they are approximations to
start with, and another, the estimated consumption curves are done many years
ago. How people use electricity has changed over time. Still, they give good enough
estimation about the nature of reality.
The calculations were done with simple model, where heating were done by
switching the heating resistors on and off. In reality the resistors can be controlled
with more intelligence, by turning the heat on in parts and with different power.
Another estimation where aggregator-retailer only operates in day-ahead spot
markets restricts the results. In reality the retailer can, and will act in other markets
as well, like in intra-day. Alas, in past it has been noted that Elbas markets have
been remarkably less volatile than Elspot-markets. This might suggest that the
main area of business for aggregator-retailer still is in Spot-markets. More detailed
research on the business cases in Elbas-markets can be read from Valtonen et al [35].
The Formula is always an attempt to depict reality. Even though the Formula
(1) is empirically tested to have a relatively good approximation, it obviously has
its restrictions and is exposed to error since heating need is a complex concept with
a lot of variables.
In the case, a direct control over heating is used, the customers do not have a right
to override the signals. By removing the customer’s behaviour reduces parameters,
but in reality it is possible to tamper the temperature to a certain level. This
simplifying procedure is acceptable, since the heating need is scaled to be constant
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at both cases: if they have got along well before nothing has changed. But, in reality
an aggregator-retailer should take this into account that people might not be too
keen to give all the control over to another party.
Rounding of the heating need hours to integers was done, in order to determine
the amount of cheapest hours per day. This results to small variation of the indoor
temperatures. It was needed partly because of the reason mentioned above, the
aggregator puts on the heating for an hour or not.
The temperature dataset was lacking the dates 2.5.2010-6.5.2010.
The case study gives a hint to the direction that the situation turns to win-win
situation for the DSO and aggregator. It could be useful to examine the effects on
the grid in more detail when there will be real, more detailed AMR-data available.
Nevertheless, the estimations and approximations done are valid and do not
affect the precision of the result too much.
7.3.3 Validity of using Spot-prices
A retailer-aggregator can offer different kinds of services to the customer. Two
possible pricing structures are introduced and explained why a retailer controls the
loads according to cheapest Spot-prices, having no matter which contract model
customer has.
Spot-priced tariff Retailer has access for the heating load and controls it by
choosing the cheapest hours from Spot-markets, bringing savings to customer’s elec-
tricity invoice. Spot-priced tariff transfers the wholesale markets’ price volatility risk
from retailer to customer. Risk transfer implies that from retailer’s perspective, it
doesn’t matter at what time the customer uses electricity.
Transferring the risk to customer means that electricity is not usually hedged
in this situation. Price offered to customer is a Spot price with a fixed margin. If
the retailer would hedge the acquired electricity, it would mean that margin would
be unknown: the acquiring price is constant and sold electricity varies. If doing
hedging, the retailer takes a calculated risk. [88]
Retailer still has to forecast the needed electricity one day ahead. This causes
uncertainties to the retailer, independent from the tariff structure the customer
has. With Spot-priced tariff, an additional variable is introduced to the forecasting:
the effects of demand response to customer’s behaviour has to be estimated. The
load dynamics has to be evaluated when acquiring electricity, how much the Spot
price-dependence shapes the customer’s consumption profile.
In this tariff structure, the signal comes from the Spot-markets. The customer
pays for the service: customer makes the contract which allows the retailer to control
the loads, optimizing the electricity consumption to the cheapest possible Spot-
hours. With Spot-priced tariff structure, using Spot-prices in calculations gives a
realistic results about retailer’s actions.
Fixed savings Another potential service imitates the contracts that are popular
today. Customer has a fixed price for electricity, but a retailer offers a service where
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it can control the loads with certain boundaries, and a customer gets fixed savings
from the electricity invoice.
In fixed energy-based tariffs the risk for price volatility is at retailer’s side. It
implies that the retailer has an interest towards controlling loads in order to avoid
price peaks and help to optimize the electricity acquirement processes.
Retailers are exposed to price and volume risks, caused by high volatility of
the electricity markets. Different financial instruments can be used to minimise
the exposure to these risks. Retailers try to lock the gross margin by hedging the
estimated electricity need beforehand.
Figure 27 shows an illustrative example on how hedging can be done. Figure
shows the hedging of the Q1 in 2010. Electricity prices can be fixed for instance
with forward products ENOQ1-10, which reflects the expected prices in the whole
Q1 time period, and the products for every month: ENOMJAN-10, ENOMFEB-10
and ENOMMAR-10 respectively. Different retail companies have different methods
for securing the electricity. The strategies differ in product portfolio mix (amount
of each product in portfolio), when the products are bought and the hedging level
(the amount of electricity secured from the total needed electricity).
Figure 27: An example on how the hedging price is created for certain time period.
From hedging, the secured price level is constant for the whole time-frame in
question. This results that if physical electricity acquiring from Spot-markets can
be optimized to cheapest possible hours, it is beneficial solution for the retailer. [88]
Hedging does not affect to the function on how the loads are controlled, if operating
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only in Spot-markets. Retailer always chooses the cheapest hours per day, regardless
of the contract he has with a customer. Therefore Spot-prices are valid in simulating
retailer’s actions.
Obviously, this load control can be offered to other parties as well, e.g. DSO and
TSO, but in this case study it is assumed that the control signals come only from
Spot markets.
7.4 Analysis
This section covers the analysis and the discussion of the findings. Analysis is done
for the whole time-frame between 2010 – 2012 to see the overall effects on more in-
telligent control. Heating is needed mostly in wintertime and therefore section 7.4.3
concentrates on the effects that are experienced during winter, from the beginning
of November until the end of the March.
Figure 28 clarifies the process on how the graphs are created. This process is
repeated for every day between 2010 – 2012. Cumulative results give us insight on
how the heating would have been controlled in the past.
Figure 28: Aggregator behaviour simulation for one day.
Calculations and data sets are shown in more detail in Appendix B.
7.4.1 Comparison on heating control methods
Spot-priced control of the loads have an impact on the traditional heating patterns.
In Figure 29, the simultaneous control signals in both methods are depicted, i.e.
when both control methods give the signal for turning the heating on at the same
time. As it can be easily seen, the signals do not coincide a lot, only 34 % of the time
during the year of 2011. Largest differences can be seen during the summer months,
as the heating need reduces significantly. Traditional control does not coincide
with day’s cheapest hours during summertime. The difference between summer
and winter has a connection to the fact that the reduced heating need leaves more
options to choose the cheapest hours, as in winter time the heating need is higher,
diminishing the amount of chosen hours to be significantly less.
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Figure 29: Signals from different control methods coincide only 34 % of the time in
2011.
Although the largest changes in heating allocation patterns is in summer-time,
it mainly has monetary benefits. For potential conflict situation with DSO, the
wintertime period is examined. The grid constraints are likely to happen in winter
as there is higher overall demand which puts stress to the grid. In next two sections
the heating allocation is examined, focusing on winter-time.
7.4.2 Heating allocation in years 2010 – 2012
Based on the calculations, an allocation in different hours of the day could be created.
Figure 30 presents the allocation of heating hours for every year, showing the heating
time of day, i.e. cheapest Spot hours. From the graph we can see that shape of the
curves are similar every year, with heating being used mainly very late at night. The
heating need varies year by year. Largest difference is seen in 2012, which has been
exceptionally warm causing diminishing heating hours. Interesting feature which
Spot-based control introduces is the small cluster of cheap hours during daytime:
between 12:00 – 16:00 a few hours would have been optimal to use for heating.
As it is shown, the heating hours are mainly in night time, starting from 23:00,
peaking at 3:00 until fading approximately at 06:00. In normal households the
consumption from other activities is rather small. Energy consumption for heating
does not coincide with other consumption which implies that power peaks do not
increase because of this action. Power peaks stay at the same level as before, but
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Figure 30: An average allocation of hours 2010-2012 (2012 extrapolated).
the 22:00 peak becomes rather exceptional than mundane. Price at 22:00 has not
been very cheap historically, meaning that heating would not be ignited very often
at this time.
If the DSO would have an option to buy peak shaving services from these hours,
it could defer the investments that come from strengthening the grid. In order to
buy this kind of service, DSO should have an incentive to do so. More importantly,
retailer has to make sure that DSO can rely to get the peak shaving when he needs
it. Otherwise it becomes too risky for DSO to even consider this option.
7.4.3 Heating allocation in wintertime
It is important to examine the most potential conditions for conflicts. This is in
wintertime when the heating need and therefore the consumption of electricity is
highest and the overloading risks of the distribution grid can be a potential threat.
Winter is examined in more detail next. The wintertime in Finland is defined in
literature to be between 1st of November until 31st of March. [43] The analysis of
the discrepancies is shown in Figure 31.
In graph 31 the difference is seen between the situation today and with aggrega-
tion with Spot-markets. Graph of optimised Spot-priced heating is an average from
winters 2010-2011. The reference graph is a traditional consumption graph which
is taken from a research of typical load diagrams, conducted in Finland and used
generally. [43] The exact hour values of it has been redrawn from the drawing of
the printed publication by the author.
From graph it can be seen that Spot-priced control changes the consumption
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Figure 31: Change in detached house consumption curve (graphs standardized).
curve radically. The heating hours shift to a later in the night. The traditional
curve start heating already from 21:00, peaking at 23:00 and fading at 06:00. Spot-
priced control has a tendency to begin heating at 23:00, peaking as late as 03:00
and fading at 05:00.
The peak power is likely to shift later in the evening. As it was mentioned in
the introduction of the case study, the 22:00 evening peak is seen as a problem for
the DSO point of view, what we can notice from the traditional consumption curve.
This peak hour shift actually serves also the interest of the DSO since now it doesn’t
coincide with other consumption in households.
7.4.4 Monetary value of the service
As mentioned in Section 7.4.1, the largest differences in control signals appear to be
in summer-time. Even though the heating need is decreased to minimum amount,
the potential savings with Spot-priced control comes from this time period.
In Figure 32, the cumulative savings for the year period are illustrated. In
examined time period, the largest savings come from the summer-time period, ap-
proximately from May until the end of August.
During winter, the heating need is larger which results to more hours overlapping.
The momentary savings can be higher if the evening hours that traditional heating
method uses are exceptionally expensive. Ripple downwards in cumulative costs
results from the model’s simplicity, as it updates the Spot-prices once a day. If the
device would have continuous monitoring of the prices and temperature, it would
update the cheapest hours every time the Spot prices are released, at 12:00 CET,
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Figure 32: Cumulative savings from Spot-priced control.
optimizing the heating up to 36 hours ahead. In a case study, the time resolution is
fixed for the next 24 hours.
It is shown that changes in more sophisticated heating control create savings
for customers. With intelligent service design this potential can be exploited and
benefits can be divided to other actors as well.
Estimations used for the calculation include the whole potential customer base
in Fortum’s network in Finland, which is approximately 50 000 customers. With 8
kW heating resistors, the monetary difference between traditional heating usage and
control by cheapest Spot-hours per day were examined. The results are presented
in Table 7.
For an average household, the drop in average Spot price can be as high as 4,76
EUR/MWh. For a individual customer with 8 kW heater, the decrease in electricity
invoice would result in approximately 57 euros per year. It is difficult to convince the
customer from the benefits of this product, since the total electricity consumption
in detached houses are high. With estimation of 13 MWh, the yearly electricity
invoice would be close to 2000 euros. Saving of 57 euros might seem meaningless for
some customers.
Nevertheless, in a large scale, putting together the small savings, the potential
sum for the whole network area cumulates to several millions of euros. Small ad-
justment to controlling would create a lot smarter system that takes into account
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Table 7: Yearly differences in average spot prices and amount of potential saving.
Year Spot aver-
age old
Spot aver-
age new
Difference Heating
need
Potential
revenue
EUR/MWh EUR/MWh EUR/MWh hours/year EUR
2010 52,23 48,10 4,12 1611 2 658 000
2011 48,06 43,30 4,76 1497 2 853 000
2012 (extrapo-
lated)
30,16 27,92 2,25 1600 1 440 000
the overall optimization of electricity markets.
7.5 Results
7.5.1 Spot-priced control transfers the heating to later at night
From a case study, two major findings can be presented:
1. With Spot-priced control of the heating loads, the peak hour appears later in
the night, at 03:00.
2. With Spot-priced control of the heating loads, the majority of the heating
hours are shifted even later in the evening compared to the traditional con-
trol method. This results in less interference to the other consumption, thus
lowering the peak load in customers’ premises.
The case study suggests that compared to the situation today, the risk of conflict
between aggregator and DSO diminishes. There is a possibility that the cheap price
in Spot prices causes the evening consumption power peak as mentioned in [40], but
closer exploration of the historical prices show us that most of the time electricity
isn’t cheap enough at 22:00 for an aggregator to put the loads on. The loads tend to
be turned on at 23:00, continuing to rise and peak at 03:00. The interference with
other consumption is reduced drastically. From this result it can be stated that even
though signals come only from the market-side, it is a win-win-situation for both
DSO and an aggregator.
7.5.2 Monetary effects
From the case study analysis, we get the result that in Fortum’s network area the
potential savings of Spot-priced control of the heating loads is significant. The
amount of potential customers in grid area will result vast savings, up to 2 850 000
euros per year. As the Smart Meters can be easily programmed to control the loads
optimally, the aggregation brings savings for the customer as well as for facilitator.
The challenging aspect with this is in the same category as in penetration of larger
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scale DR schemes as well: there is not enough incentives for a customer to accept
this kind of arrangement if the saving potential is rather small, varying from 30 –
57 euros per year.
Another aspect that has to be considered before this kind of control can take on
hold is the retailers interest for creating this kind of service. In order for customers
to benefit fully from this, the Spot-priced tariff is a requirement. The retailer moves
the risk of fluctuating electricity prices to the customer. Usually these tariffs have
the certain margin to cover the forecasting errors from actual consumption and other
incurring expenses, but the risk of using or not using the electricity during expensive
hours is transferred to the customer.
As long as the fee for the customers is energy-based and attached to a Spot price,
from retailer’s perspective it doesn’t make a difference on what hour the customer
uses the electricity. Retailer acquires the electricity from Spot-markets and hedging
is not needed. The main reason for the retailer to get interested in this functionality
is the competitive advantage over others for creating a product which helps the
customer to save money and therefore making it look more attractive. Third option
is to generate a product which would engage a part of the savings to the benefit of
the retailer. This solution would acquire some agreements with a customer for the
dividend of the sum.
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8 Conclusions
In the fast evolving market environment, the actors have to adapt to the new con-
ditions. Changing conditions force the actors to re-design their position and role in
the value network. As the new positions are formed, stakeholders experience friction
with each other since many actors has similar interests.
This thesis mapped the most potential conflict situations among players that
can escalate in presence of a Smart Grid. Furthermore, main challenges and pos-
sibilities that a Smart Grid introduces were presented. Third part focused on the
relationship between an aggregator and the DSO. It has been debated that actions
of an aggregator might result in conflict situation with DSO. A case study was made
to investigate the matter. It was discovered that in Nordic electricity markets do-
main, the Spot-priced control of the loads shifts the heating need to the night-time,
overlapping less with other consumption in households.
8.1 Changes in roles and potential conflicts between stake-
holders
The review from the challenges and possibilities concludes, that problems are mainly
set in the interface of the regulated business and non-regulated business. A Smart
Grid enables new concepts, such as Demand Flexibility and Distributed Energy
Storages, which have qualities that can ease the trouble that is experienced in the
system side. Problematic is that the same qualities, Demand Response and Energy
Storages, can be introduced on the open competition side as well. Electricity envi-
ronment will need clarification on what is the role of a regulated actor DSO in the
future.
Issues regarding the regulation was raised. The consistency for the regulatory
policies has not been satisfactory. The long-term strategy has not been consistent
and new rules are often adapted at fast pace. Too rapid changes to the strategy
moves the players’ actions further away from the optimal equilibrium, since the
predictions about the future become more difficult to see. A trust to long-term
regulation is lacking at the moment, which hinders the development and reduces the
interest for long-term investments, if the return of investment cannot be determined
to an accurate level.
A lot of expectations are built up for the EU-level regulation. Doubts whether
the situation will take turn for better are sceptical since every member country has
its own policies: a consensus for the best model hasn’t been reached, hindering the
creation of an integrated EU electricity markets.
In total, 33 different conflicts were discovered, and two themes were highlighted
above others in determining the most critical questions. First, the changes in energy
production structure and second, the integration of ICT to the energy industry.
The emergence of a small scale renewable energy production have a large impact
on the power generation structure, making it less flexible. Growing inflexibility
in energy production side causes the pressure for the demand side to be elastic,
implicating that in future the DR will become more valuable.
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The intermittent nature of DER weakens the accuracy of forecasting, as it is
brought to the Spot-markets one day before the actual delivery. It is harder to
forecast the actual production and consumption beforehand. A possibility to bring
DER to the markets as flexible bids is suggested.
The renewable energy subsidy policy needs to be designed carefully, in order
to achieve the wanted goals without undesired effects. Subsidies easily distort the
behaviour of the markets, resulting in suboptimal solutions from the society’s point
of view.
Second theme evolves around the topic on transition from analogue world to dig-
ital world. Creating the comprehensive ICT-system over the organizational bound-
aries requires holistic approach in order to succeed. Design of a functional Informa-
tion Exchange is a crucial factor to be solved, which needs collaboration from all
the stakeholders in the field.
Emergence of the new players, an aggregator, prosumers and ESCO, was seen
as a positive development in energy business. New players concentrate on the very
main challenges the electricity sector experiences: inability for flexibility as well as
for inability for storing electricity. The consensus was that bringing flexibility to
the demand-side is an essential part of well functioning markets. Undefined roles of
new stakeholders in electricity domain raises questions among existing players.
8.2 Conflict between an aggregator and DSO
In literature, it has been stated that aggregation might result in a conflict situation
between an aggregator and DSO, because an aggregator takes advantage from the
price differences in the electricity markets, shifting loads to the cheapest possible
time. In micro-level from DSO perspective, situations exist when the synchronous
load control can result in the increase of the peak load, thus posing a threat for more
grid congestions. Grid congestions can escalate even though the overall demand, and
hence the wholesale markets’ system price, is low.
In thesis, the effects of an aggregator action in Finland was studied. Finland
has untapped potential for the small-scale Demand Response because of the large
amount of electrical heating used in house-holds. The situation, where an aggregator
controls the loads according to the Spot-prices were analysed. Study presents that
compared to the traditional load control method, the heating need shifts later to
the night. At present, heating causes the peak at 22:00, when there is electricity
consumption from other electrical devices as well. With Spot-priced control, the
peak would be at 03:00. During the night, the electricity consumption from other
electrical devices in households is minimal. Hence Spot-priced control method would
improve the situation by decreasing the peak load.
8.3 Recommendations for further research
Thesis mapped the comprehensive picture on the conflicts of interests from differ-
ent stakeholders’ perspective. Information Exchange and the effect of renewable
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production were discovered as the key issues that have an influence to the future
outlook.
Further research on different Information Exchange models and their potential
should be researched in more detail. The implementation of the common data
hub among players has far-reaching impacts for the whole sector, so the questions
regarding the data hub and its functionalities need further research.
8.4 Recommendations for Fortum
This thesis investigated the potential changes in roles and responsibilities from the
perspectives of different stakeholders. Fortum Corporation acts as an generator, a
retailer and as a DSO. Therefore, three relevant recommendations for the Fortum
are as follows:
1. Explore and conduct a market research for exploiting the small-scale aggrega-
tion business.
2. Be strongly committed and promote the collaboration for the creation of a
central data hub.
3. Pro-actively explore the effects for the business in case of EU-wide capacity
markets.
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B Appendix B
This section presents background information for the calculations which were con-
ducted for the case study 7.
In Figure A1, the graph for the yearly average temperatures and the daily heating
need is shown, ranging from three to nine hours. These are rounded numbers with
minimum limit to three hours. Also the accurate results from Formula (1) is shown,
to show the comparison.
From the heating need per day with addition data set of Nord Pool Spot’s hourly
Spot-price, the control signals for loads is created. This procedure is illustrated in
Table A2. Three days from the whole dataset is extracted, showing the differences
in fraction of three days, to illustrate the possible differences in controlling methods.
Figure A3 shows the volatility of the Spot-markets, with price peaks cut from
graph. The Spot-priced load control is shown on red color. It is to demonstrate the
saving potential the more intelligent control method can introduce.
For monetary savings, the heated hours connected to the control method in
question is presented in Figure A4. It shows the potential of monetary savings
throughout the year, with main savings in summer-time.
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Figure A1: The daily average temperatures and the heating need per day in 2011.
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Figure A2: Differences in heating control methods.
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Figure A3: Heating based on Spot-prices avoids the price peaks, example extracted
between 1.1.2010 – 10.1.2010.
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Figure A4: Cumulative costs of control methods in 2011.
